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Urban gun violence touches on issues central to American life: safety, equality, opportunity, 
and community. As thousands of city residents are killed or injured with guns each year, 
mayors and other community leaders face an urgent challenge: finding effective solutions 
and implementing them to make a difference now and into the future. This report, a 
collaboration between Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund, Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 
and the National Urban League, is a tool for all city leaders who want to reduce gun violence.
First, the report summarizes much of what is known about urban gun violence: its causes, 
the ways it differs from violence in other settings, and the ways it undercuts many other 
aspects of city life. It is not the intent of this report to explain all the variation in gun violence 
across cities; instead, it is a primer for cities that want to act today, in spite of uncertainty. Far 
from presenting novel ideas, it brings together the knowledge of academic researchers, 
community activists, nonprofit leaders, and civil servants who have been addressing gun 
violence in cities for decades.
Second, the report describes seven strategies that dozens of cities have taken to reduce 
gun violence in their communities, drawing on specific case studies. The identified 
interventions address factors known to contribute to urban gun violence, are supported by 
a growing body of evidence, and can each be a part of any city’s larger strategy for reducing 
gun violence. This is not a comprehensive account of the hard work taking place in 
communities across the country, the volume of which is impossible to capture, but these 
case studies demonstrate that cities can learn from one another, building on successes, and 
informed by a growing body of evidence. 
Everytown for Gun Safety is the largest gun violence prevention organization in the 
country with more than three million supporters and more than 100,000 donors, including 
moms, mayors, survivors, and everyday Americans, who are fighting for public safety 
measures that respect the Second Amendment and help save lives. At the core of 
Everytown are Mayors Against Illegal Guns, Moms Demand Action for Gun Sense in America 
and the Everytown Survivor Network. 
Mayors Against Illegal Guns is a bipartisan coalition of more than 1,000 current and 
former mayors united around the common goals of protecting communities by holding gun 
offenders accountable; demanding access to crime gun trace data that is critical to law 
enforcement efforts to combat gun trafficking; and working with legislators to fix 
weaknesses and loopholes in the background check system that make it far too easy for 
criminals and other dangerous people to get guns. 
The National Urban League is a historic civil rights organization dedicated to economic 
empowerment in order to elevate the standard of living in historically underserved urban 
communities. Founded in 1910 and headquartered in New York City, the National Urban 
League spearheads the efforts of its local affiliates through the development of programs, 
public policy research and advocacy. Today, the National Urban League has 95 affiliates 
serving 300 communities, in 35 states and the District of Columbia, providing direct services 
that impact and improve the lives of more than two million people nationwide.
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Executive Summary
Residents and leaders of America’s cities face few challenges more urgent than gun violence. 
It takes thousands of lives, depresses the quality of life of whole neighborhoods, drives 
people to move away, and reduces cities’ attractiveness for newcomers. It makes it harder 
for schools, businesses, and community institutions to thrive.
Urban gun violence also reflects and worsens America’s existing racial and economic 
disparities. In a recent year in Milwaukee, for example, young black men were killed with 
guns at a rate 20 times the national average, and were 100 times more likely to be shot than 
white Milwaukee residents of the same age.
But for mayors and community members looking to take concrete, evidence-based steps to 
address gun violence, cities are also a source of innovative solutions. Across the country, 
whether in focused initiatives or broad programs, cities are developing gun violence reduction 
strategies that other municipalities can adopt and build into their own approaches. 
This report proceeds in two sections, first by describing what is known about urban gun 
violence, and then providing examples of what cities have done about it. It begins by 
assessing the scale of urban gun violence, reviewing factors known to influence it, and 
identifying questions researchers are still grappling with:
In America, which has one of the highest rates of gun homicide in the world, cities 
experience gun violence at further elevated rates. Americans are 25 times more 
likely to be shot to death than residents of other comparably wealthy nations, but the 
odds are even worse for Americans who reside in cities. The country’s 25 largest cities 
contain barely one-tenth of the U.S. population but account for more than one in five 
Americans murdered with guns.
In American cities, when a crime turns deadly, it is almost exclusively because 
of a gun. An assault committed with a gun is at least five times more likely to result in 
death than an assault with a knife. As a result, most fatal violence in cities is 
committed with guns—nine out of ten homicides in some cities — and the difference 
between America’s safest cities and its most dangerous ones is almost entirely a 
matter of gun violence. 
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Strong gun laws matter, within and beyond city borders. Strong state laws that 
prohibit dangerous people from having guns make it harder for them to arm 
themselves, blocking their access to legal sources and increasing costs and risks in the 
black market. But guns know no borders; nationwide, nearly 30 percent of guns 
recovered from crime scenes were first sold in a different state. That means cities also 
depend on strong laws in neighboring states, which make it harder for criminals to 
obtain guns there and traffic them back into the city. 
Unable to get guns legally, criminals may still obtain them in black markets 
supplied by unlicensed sales, negligent dealers, and theft. In the 32 states where 
unlicensed sellers can offer handguns in so-called ”private sales” without background 
checks, criminals exploit those sales to obtain guns despite being prohibited from 
owning guns. A few licensed gun dealers selling guns carelessly or deliberately 
trafficking guns to criminals can also feed the underground gun market. And gun 
owners who store their guns negligently leave them vulnerable to theft, which puts 
them directly into criminal hands. 
Within cities, a small share of places and people are vastly more likely to be 
affected by gun violence than others. The majority of gun homicides in cities occur 
within a limited geographic area and among a small group of high-risk people. This is 
partially explained by gangs, which exacerbate rates of gun violence by obtaining guns 
for their members, promoting the carrying of weapons, and initiating disputes that turn 
violent and spur retaliation. But whole neighborhoods suffer the consequences, as 
bystanders get caught in the gunfire and young people exposed to violence face a 
higher risk of later participating in it themselves. Even vacant lots and other aspects of a 
city’s physical environment may contribute, by providing hiding place to keep illegal 
guns easily accessible. And all of this has a disproportionate impact on communities of 
color, who are more likely to live in areas best by these issues. Situations of domestic 
violence also become far more dangerous when a firearm is present, a problem that is 
not unique to cities but accounts for a significant share of urban gun violence. 
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Some changes in gun violence are still beyond easy explanation. Over the last 
decade, nearly 80 percent of America’s 25 largest cities experienced significant 
declines in gun violence. Strong laws and enforcement, interventions to reduce the 
supply of illegal guns, and efforts to disrupt gangs and turn their members away from 
violence all played a part, though none fully explains the change. Policing, in particular, 
has been the subject of considerable scrutiny and debate and has had an indisputable 
influence on gun violence in cities, though an assessment of specific tactics is beyond 
the scope of this report. The variation in gun violence between and within cities poses 
new questions for researchers, but it demonstrates one thing definitively: gun violence 
does not need to be a fact of life for American cities.
Even without all of the answers, city leaders can act today to help reduce gun 
violence. This report does not resolve every open question about gun violence; instead, 
it highlights what cities can do in spite of uncertainty. And whether in cities that have 
experienced remarkable declines in gun violence over the last decade or in those where 
shootings remain stubbornly frequent, this reports identifies and elevates individual 
programs that are having an impact within particular neighborhoods and among 
specific groups.
The second half of this report walks through seven strategies cities have adopted to reduce 
gun violence. Some narrowly target particular aspects of urban gun violence while others 
seek broader citywide impacts. A few have been implemented numerous times and across 
many cities, while others are new but promising.
1.  Cities can harness their own data to better understand the specific factors that drive 
gun violence. From Milwaukee, WI, where public health and criminal justice officials 
review every homicide and shooting in the city, to Chicago, IL, where an analysis of crime 
gun trace data exposed all the sources of the city’s underground gun market, data can 
help policy makers address gun crime with solutions tailored to local circumstances.
2.  Cities can reduce the supply of illegal guns by cutting off the sources of their local 
underground markets. In Lafayette Parish, LA, after public safety officials recognized that 
criminals in the area were stealing guns stored in cars, they initiated a public education 
campaign to promote responsible gun storage in vehicles and reduce this opportunity for 
theft. In Tucson, AZ, local legislators passed an ordinance requiring gun shows on city 
property to require background checks for all sellers. 
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3.  Cities can improve public spaces to make it harder for criminals to stash or use 
firearms. Vacant lots in Philadelphia, PA, provided a hiding place for guns, so city 
partnerships transformed the lots into green spaces. And New York City is confronting 
gun violence outside public housing units by lighting areas that were otherwise 
hazardous after dark. 
4.  Cities can adopt measures to improve investigations of gun crimes and leave fewer 
gun crimes unsolved. A discarded firearm or a few spent casings is physical evidence 
that can link a crime scene to a perpetrator, and officers are making better use of that 
evidence in cities around the country — from thorough forensic inspection of recovered 
crime guns in Denver, CO, to protocols for evidence collection in Palm Beach County, FL, 
that ensure weapons arrests stand up in court.
5.  Cities can help break the cycle of violence and retaliation by running programs 
that focus on the places and people most likely to be affected. These programs  
aim to change group and individual behavior and to defuse conflicts before they 
escalate. From Cincinnati, OH, to Richmond, CA, cities are working with law enforcement, 
street outreach workers, and hospitals to engage with high-risk individuals and give 
them alternatives to violence.
6.  Cities can offer positive alternatives to at-risk individuals before they fall into 
patterns of violence, using interventions shown to have long-term impacts on violent 
behavior. Chicago, IL, has been piloting new programs, including cognitive behavioral 
therapy and short-term summer employment, which have reduced arrests and increased 
graduation rates. 
7.  Because fatal domestic violence accounts for as many as one in six homicides in some cities, 
city leaders can also ensure that dangerous domestic abusers do not have illegal access 
to guns. In Dallas County, TX, judges developed a courtroom process to ensure that 
convicted domestic abusers who are prohibited from having firearms relinquish them as 
mandated by law, and partnered with a local firing range to hold the guns for safekeeping.
None of these tactics alone is enough to eliminate gun violence in American cities. Nor is any 
one of them right for all cities at all times. But together, this set of strategies represents a 
promising approach: adopting evidence-based measures that are tailored to how gun 
violence in any given city actually works. By tackling gun violence in this way, cities can build 
strong and vibrant communities, and save thousands of lives.
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Actions Cities Can Take
PRINCIPLE OBJECTIVE ACTION
UNDERSTAND 
THE MAJOR 
FACTORS 
DRIVING LOCAL 
GUN VIOLENCE
Review each homicide to understand why 
it happened and how that could inform 
future interventions
Establish a multi-stakeholder process including law enforcement, 
community members, and social services to review every 
homicide, analyze and publish findings, and identify targeted local 
approaches to prevent future incidents
Apply a public health analysis  
to local crime patterns
Conduct epidemiological research on local risk factors  
for gun crime involvement, and use the findings to improve  
city gun violence prevention strategies
Improve utility and use of  
crime gun trace data
Submit every recovered crime gun to the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) to generate data about  
the circumstances of its first retail sale
Call on Congress to repeal the Tiahrt Amendments,  
which restrict public access to crime gun trace data
Train law enforcement in firearm identification to increase the 
share of crime gun traces that are successful
Pool trace data with other communities through regional 
networks and through ATF's Collective Data Sharing program
Analyze trace data to evaluate existing laws and practices and 
disseminate findings to educate the public and inform safer gun 
dealer practices
Map the locations where  
most gun crime occurs
Identify the small share of a city’s area where the majority of gun 
crimes occur and build accountability for reducing it
REDUCE THE 
SUPPLY OF  
ILLEGAL GUNS
Require background checks  
for all gun sales
Require criminal background checks for all  
unlicensed gun sales within city-limits
Pass resolutions calling on state and federal legislators to act
Strengthen oversight of gun dealers
Use litigation to reform the practices of negligent gun dealers
Work with local gun dealers to develop city ordinances  
fostering more responsible sales practices
Foster responsible practices  
among unlicensed gun sellers
Target educational materials about responsible firearm  
ownership and legal sale practices to recent gun buyers 
Reduce gun theft
Require reporting of lost and stolen firearms
Collect and analyze reports of lost and stolen guns
Educate the public about ways to reduce gun theft
Enact laws promoting responsible storage of firearms in vehicles
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PRINCIPLE OBJECTIVE ACTION
IMPROVE 
PUBLIC  
SPACES  
IN CITIES
“Clean and green”  
vacant lots and buildings
Develop vacant lots into green spaces and motivate landlords  
to keep vacant buildings up to certain standards,  
deterring nearby crime
Shine a light on high-crime areas
Work with communities to improve nighttime illumination  
in areas where violence is prevalent
LEAVE FEWER  
GUN CRIMES  
UNSOLVED
Use the best available  
forensic technology and processes  
to solve serious gun crimes
Take a state-of-the-art approach to  
firearm ballistics investigations 
Advocate that every new  
semiautomatic handgun feature 
microstamping technology
Call on state legislators to require that all new handguns  
be fitted with a microstamped firing pin, allowing for  
easier identification of ballistics if it is used in a crime
Use acoustic technology  
to detect gunfire as it occurs
Adopt acoustic gunshot detection technology  
and analyze and act on the results
Respond when criminals attempt  
to buy guns and fail background checks
Empower local law enforcement to respond when  
prohibited people try to buy guns and fail background checks,  
making arrests when the circumstances warrant
Increase the speed and certainty  
of prosecution and enforcing  
penalties for serious gun offenses
Adopt protocols to ensure the integrity of firearm-related evidence
Create mechanisms to track the progress of people arrested  
for gun offenses through the criminal justice system
FOCUS ON THE 
PEOPLE AND 
PLACES MOST 
LIKELY TO  
BE AFFECTED
Intervene in group violence  
with 'focused deterrence'
Identify the groups of individuals most likely to be  
involved in violence and tailor a mix of sanctions and  
services to shift them away from it
Defuse conflicts driving the 
 transmission of gun violence  
with ‘violence interrupters’
Employ street outreach workers to monitor and  
intervene in conflicts with high potential to escalate;  
have them promote nonviolent responses
Provide comprehensive services  
to victims of gunshot wounds
Target specialized services to firearm injury victims,  
who are at high risk to be involved in gun violence again 
OFFER POSITIVE 
ALTERNATIVES 
TO INDIVIDUALS 
WITH  
RISK FACTORS  
FOR VIOLENT 
BEHAVIOR
Offer cognitive behavioral therapy  
to help youth respond thoughtfully  
in difficult situations
Create a safe space for medium-risk youth to talk through issues 
that impact their daily lives; educate them on appropriate 
responses to conflict, and encourage behavioral adaptations  
that reduce the potential for violence 
Provide summer employment  
programs for students in  
high-violence neighborhoods
Invest in programs that allow at-risk youth to work,  
keeping them busy during the summer months, instilling a  
sense of self-worth, and providing valuable interpersonal skills 
IMPROVE 
RESPONSES  
TO DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE
Ensure that convicted  
domestic abusers turn in  
their guns as required by law
Improve criminal justice protocols so that  
domestic abusers turn in their guns when they  
become prohibited from firearm possession
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Part One
—
Understanding 
Gun Violence  
in American Cities
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THE COST OF GUN VIOLENCE TO AMERICAN CITIES
The majority of Americans who experience gun violence in everyday life have something 
else in common: they live in cities.
America’s gun homicide rate is extraordinarily high — 25 times the rates of comparable 
nations1 — but gun violence does not touch all American communities in the same way, or 
with the same intensity. The gun homicide rate in American cities is more than double the 
national rate, and the 25 largest cities account for barely a tenth of the national 
population but account for more than a fifth of U.S. gun homicides.2 Gun violence is 
a problem across America, but cities bear the heaviest burden.3
There are disparities within cities as well. In the safest police district in Philadelphia, no one 
was injured by gunfire in 2014, while the most violent district had 130 shooting victims.4 
Over the last fifteen years, the safest police precinct in New York City (Precinct 15, 
Manhattan’s East Side) experienced nine homicides; its most dangerous (Precinct 75, the 
Brooklyn neighborhood of East New York) experienced 413.5
Gun violence also disproportionately impacts communities of color. Nationwide, a black 
man is fourteen times more likely than a white non-Hispanic man to be shot to death.6 The 
disparity is starker in some cities, particularly among the young: in Milwaukee, WI, in 2015, 
for example, black men ages 15 to 24 were 100 times more likely to be shot than white 
non-Hispanic males of the same age.7
The damage inflicted by gun violence goes far beyond lost lives, and all city residents pay 
the cost. Gun violence strains public services like law enforcement and medical care, and it 
depresses economic growth by lowering property values and driving residents to leave their 
communities. One study found that for each homicide in a city, 70 residents flee, further 
hollowing out neighborhoods where tax revenues are already low and services insufficient.8
By one estimate, a single gunshot wound has a societal cost of about $1 million when all the 
consequences are added up; by extrapolation, the researchers projected that gun violence 
costs Chicago $2.5 billion dollars each year.10 Economic research on real estate prices show 
that in high-crime areas, houses can lose as much as 40 percent of their value.11 And an 
analysis of eight major American cities found that violent crime imposed total direct costs 
on them of $3.7 billion per year.12
But just as high rates of gun violence depress the growth of communities, reducing those 
rates allows cities to flourish. The analysis of eight cities found that lower homicide rates 
translated into significant increases in housing values — and as housing values rise, so do 
property tax revenues, providing funds to strengthen city services and further bolster 
growth. A 10 percent reduction in homicides was predicted to increase residential real 
estate values in the eight studied cities by more than $15 billion.13 While the measures 
described in this report may require cities to invest time and resources, the costs 
are negligible compared to the toll cities already pay for gun violence each and 
every day.
“Safe streets are a 
necessary platform  
for neighborhood 
growth and prosperity.”
PHILIP COOK,  
PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS,  
DUKE UNIVERSITY, NC9
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AMERICA’S EXCEPTIONAL RATE  
OF URBAN GUN VIOLENCE
Some features of urban life that contribute to cities’ higher rates of gun violence cannot 
be changed. Because cities bring great wealth and poverty together, there is greater 
financial incentive for robbery, which contributes to some violent crime.14 At the same 
time, the anonymity of city life means people who commit crimes face a lower probability 
of being recognized or arrested. Indeed, in cities, the clearance rate for murder 
investigations — the share ending in an arrest — is substantially lower than that in towns 
and rural areas.15 Perhaps most importantly, over the second half of the twentieth century, 
many U.S. cities saw a concentration of poverty and disadvantage unrivaled elsewhere in 
the country,16 factors associated with significantly more violent crime.17
But there is no ironclad rule that cities must be more violent than other types of 
communities; the low rates of violence experienced by cities elsewhere around the world 
makes this clear. Large cities in the United Kingdom,Canada, Australia, and  
New Zealand 18  do not experience homicides at nearly the level of even America’s 
safest cities — and they are ten times safer than America’s most violent ones  
(see Appendix).
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Cities and Gun Suicide
While cities experience elevated 
rates of gun homicide, they 
experience lower rates of another 
form of gun violence: suicide. A CDC 
analysis of mortality data in 2006-7 
found that the average gun suicide 
rate in 62 large cities was 43 percent 
lower than that in areas outside of 
their metropolitan areas, 
representing a total of about 1,450 
fewer gun suicides each year.19 A 
separate review of youth suicide 
data found that rural youth were 
more than twice as likely to kill 
themselves with a firearm as urban 
youth, and the disparity grew 
significantly wider between 1996 
and 2010.20 In New York City, the 
firearm suicide rate is one-seventh 
the national rate, pulling the city’s 
overall suicide rate down to about 
half the national average.21
This pattern is consistent with a 
large body of research showing that 
Americans are more likely to commit 
suicide if they live in an area with a 
higher household prevalence of 
firearms22 or if they themselves have 
recently purchased a gun.23 While 
rates of gun ownership are rarely 
measured, prior national surveys 
found that respondents in large 
cities were about half as likely to 
own firearms as those in rural 
communities.24 Rates of gun suicide 
are also lower among immigrant and 
non-white populations, groups that 
constitute a larger share of urban 
populations.25
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A UNIQUELY LETHAL WEAPON
When it comes to making American cities safe, “crime is not the problem,” criminologist Frank 
Zimring famously wrote.26 Lethal violence is the problem, he argued, and it is committed 
almost exclusively with guns. This is a consequence of guns’ basic mechanics: they are 
uniquely lethal. In studies going back decades, assaults involving firearms have proven to be 
five times more likely to end in the death of the victim than those involving knives, and the 
difference is even greater with higher-caliber firearms.27 Contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
the vast majority of crimes are committed by criminals who are unarmed.28 But more than two 
in three U.S. murders are by gunshot,29 and in America’s most violent cities that share rises as 
high as 90 percent — the vast majority committed with handguns.
The difference between America’s safest cities and its most dangerous ones is almost 
exclusively attributable to gun violence. The country’s 25 largest cities vary relatively little in 
terms of non-gun homicides —from between 1.2 and 7 per 100,000 residents on average 
between 2011-15, for example —but they diverge in gun homicides over seven times that range 
from 1 to 40 per 100,000 residents (See Appendix). And in the cities with the highest homicide 
rates, guns account for nearly 9 in 10 murders. This raises the question of why disputes in some 
cities are so much more likely to end in gunfire, with deadly consequences. The answer hinges in 
part on who commits those homicides, how they obtained their guns, and what policies were—
or weren’t—in place to prevent them from doing so.
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STRONG GUN LAWS MATTER
While no law will entirely stop criminals from accessing guns, strong laws make it more 
difficult, blocking access to the legal market and increasing the cost and risk of obtaining one 
elsewhere. This, in turn, reduces the likelihood that the crimes they commit will be deadly.
Since 1968, federal law has prohibited certain narrow categories of persons from buying or 
possessing firearms including convicted felons and domestic abusers, who are at higher risk 
for subsequent offenses. And since 1994 all licensed gun dealers are required to conduct 
instant background checks on their buyers, to ensure they are not barred from possessing 
firearms. The process takes just minutes, and each year tens of millions of lawful gun 
purchasers complete checks without incident, but tens of thousands of prohibited people 
also attempt to buy guns from dealers and the background check stops those sales.30
But there is a huge loophole in federal law, which exempts unlicensed sales from the 
background check requirement, including transfers between strangers who meet online, 
and this provides criminals ready access to guns they are not legally allowed to own. 
Unlicensed sales take place with no background check and no record keeping, which means 
they make up an unknowable share of total firearm sales, but it is certain the number is 
significant. National surveys in the early 1990s and 2000s found that about 40 percent of 
gun owners obtained their firearms in transfers that would not require a background 
check31 — a share that forthcoming research appears to confirm.32 Given the size of the U.S. 
gun market, this means that millions of guns are exchanged each year without background 
checks. And surveys of people incarcerated for gun crimes consistently show a majority 
obtained their firearms in unlicensed transfers.33 While 18 states have gone beyond federal 
law to require background checks on all handgun sales, 32 states continue to allow 
unlicensed transfers to occur without a check, no questions asked.34 
Consequently, some cities are hobbled by state legislators who fail to pass strong laws —  
in their own capitols and in those of neighboring states. An analysis of gun trafficking in 53 
U.S. cities found that those in states where background checks were required for unlicensed 
handgun sales had 48 percent less intrastate gun trafficking.35
Even in states with strong laws, traffickers go to states where laws are weak and return with 
trafficked guns. In 2014, 28 percent of guns that law enforcement successfully traced back to 
their first retail sale came from a different state than that in which they were recovered; in 
New York City, the share from out-of-state topped 90 percent.36 And about half of the traced 
crime guns that crossed state lines nationwide came from just 10 states where gun laws are 
particularly weak.37 States that do not require background checks for all handgun sales 
export nearly three times as many guns that are later recovered at out-of-state crime 
scenes as states that require background checks, controlling for population.38
Read about how Tucson, AZ, 
addressed this on page 30
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SHRINKING THE BLACK MARKET FOR GUNS
As in the rest of the country, gun violence in cities takes place in a range of varied 
circumstances: an irate neighbor allegedly shoots and kills an acquaintance after a dispute;39 
an abuser allegedly shoots and kills a former girlfriend;40 a gang-involved man shooting at a 
member of a rival group kills a third party.41 Yet all three of these murders have a common 
thread, which is typical of gun crimes in cities as it is nationwide: the perpetrator was 
prohibited from possessing guns due to a history of high-risk behavior, but obtained one 
anyway. A study of people incarcerated for committing gun crimes found that only 30 
percent would have been able to legally possess their firearm under the strongest state 
laws.42 A forthcoming analysis of the criminal records of 620 adults who had committed 
firearms crimes in Boston found that 64 percent were prohibited from possessing firearms 
at the time of the crime.43 Cities experience elevated rates of gun violence, in large part, 
because their scale allows them to support a black market that puts guns into dangerous 
hands.
But evidence is growing that strong laws and effective enforcement can constrain the black 
market and improve public safety. At least in some U.S. cities, the supply of illegal guns is 
relatively limited, buyers and sellers are hard to find, and doing so is risky. A seminal study of 
the black market for firearms in Chicago showed that contrary to conventional wisdom, it’s 
not cheap or easy to buy a gun on the street: criminals report paying $250 to $400 on the 
black market for guns valued at only $50 to $100 in the legal market, the quality of firearms 
is uncertain, and conducting the transaction poses substantial risk of harm or arrest. More 
than one in three attempts to purchase a gun in Chicago’s black market ended in failure.44 
When the underground market for guns is suppressed, gun violence may fall as a result. 
Forthcoming research shows that between 1981 and 2014, changes in the number of 
handguns recovered by Boston police were strongly associated with changes in the number 
of gun homicides: when fewer handguns were on the streets and recovered by cops, fewer 
gun homicides took place.45
The channels supplying the illegal gun market in each city vary; in some, research suggests 
just a few licensed gun dealers are funneling a large volume of guns to the black market, 
even unwittingly. While most gun dealers run their businesses responsibly, a small share sell 
a disproportionate share of guns later used in crimes, and it isn’t just because they sell more 
guns to begin with. When ATF reviewed data tracing guns recovered at crime scenes back to 
the retailers who first sold them, the agency found that just 1.2 percent of gun dealers 
accounted for fully 57.4 percent of the traced guns.46 A 2005 study of handguns sold in 
California, which controlled for retailers’ sales-volume, found a diminished but persistent 
concentration: dealers who accounted for 18 percent of handgun sales were responsible for 
46 percent of traced guns used in violent firearm crimes.47 Dealers’ diligence in spotting 
illegal purchasers varies widely: under test conditions, significant proportions of licensed 
retailers prove willing to sell guns to “straw purchasers,” a trafficking technique where a 
criminal picks out a gun and then another person buys it under their name.48
Theft is another significant contributor to the black market. By definition, every stolen gun 
winds up in criminal hands, and these thefts undermine policies that attempt to staunch the 
flow of guns to the black market through other trafficking channels. U.S. Department of 
Justice data suggests that thefts of firearms are declining nationwide but 145,300 guns were 
still lost this way in 2010.49 And while just a fraction of people incarcerated for gun crimes 
report having obtained their firearm by stealing it themselves, stolen guns invariably make 
their way through the black market to criminal end-users.50
Read about how Lyons, IL, 
addressed this on page 31
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Everytown obtained data from police departments in 14 major American cities, who 
together received reports of 9,817 stolen guns in 2014 (see Appendix). The rates of reported 
firearm thefts vary across cities by an order of magnitude, likely reflecting differing rates of 
residential burglary, prevalence of firearm ownership, and gun storage practices.
Finally, even where cities successfully constrain the supply of illegal firearms, they may still 
need to alter public spaces that otherwise sustain gun availability. For decades, in cities 
across the country, law enforcement have observed people sharing “community guns” 
stashed in public places.51 Ethnographic research in a high-crime neighborhood in Chicago 
suggested that youths unaffiliated with gangs may purchase guns collectively because they 
have limited access to gun dealers or because they can’t afford a gun on their own.52 Kept in 
a public place — in a mailbox, a bag under the stairs, a wheel well, the bottom of a light pole, 
a garbage pail, a hallway radiator, under a building, or in the possession of a person (“the 
holster”) who is above suspicion53 — these guns have the potential to increase the 
accessibility of firearms even when supply is suppressed.
FIREARMS REPORTED LOST OR STOLEN PER 100,000 RESIDENTS, 2014
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Read about how 
Philadelphia, PA, 
addressed this on page 35
Read about how Lafayette 
Parish, LA, addressed this on 
page 34
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RISK AND GUN VIOLENCE
Within any given city, gun violence is not evenly distributed across its residents or its 
neighborhoods; a few people and places are far more at-risk than others. That risk, in turn, 
is shaped by the relationships between people that make violence more likely and more 
deadly, and the places where violence is so frequent it becomes a vicious cycle. 
Understanding how risk shapes gun violence, in turn, can help policy makers think about 
where and who to best target for intervention.
Gangs are one factor that elevate risk. Whether referred to as groups, crews, or cliques, they 
contribute to gun violence in cities across the U.S. by initiating disputes that can turn violent, 
by affecting local norms about violence and guns as personal protection, and by increasing 
members’ access to firearms even where gun laws are otherwise strongly enforced. Gang-
involved youth are also among those at highest risk of becoming victims of gun crimes. But 
the violence produced by gangs extends far beyond the gangs themselves and into the 
communities they are a part of — and it can’t be dismissed or ignored.
There is no single, concise definition for gang-related violence — the U.S. Department of 
Justice has a tiered, five-part taxonomy54 — but most cities across the country report 
gang-related activity,55 characterized by groups of individuals that adopt a collective identity 
and use violence as a tool to achieve their ends.
In some but not all cities, gangs contribute significantly to elevated rates of violence. A 
review of large U.S. cities found that their rates of gang-related homicides varied widely; 
even in five cities with a high prevalence of gang homicides, they ranged from 10 to 42 
percent of total homicides in each city.56 As cities successfully curb other types of violence, 
gang violence becomes increasingly prominent. In Chicago, where the number of non-gang-
related homicides fell from 1991 to 2011, the share due to gangland disputes crept upward 
from 15 percent to 30 percent.57 Gang-involved shootings are also particularly “contagious,” 
often spurring retaliatory and repetitive gun violence.58
Gangs increase violence in American cities, in part, because gang-affiliated youth are more 
likely to have firearms with them when disputes arise. One study found that, controlling for 
other factors, gang members were three times more likely to carry guns than non-gang-
affiliated youth.59 Gangs also provide their members with guns trafficked from out of state 
— undermining strong laws that might otherwise curb access. A recent study of crime guns 
recovered in Chicago found that gang members were more likely to have guns that had 
been obtained from licensed dealers in other states, particularly in nearby Indiana where 
gun laws are weak.60 A forthcoming study of guns recovered in Boston showed that those 
recovered from gang members were 58 percent more likely to come from southern states 
on the trafficking route known as the Interstate 95 “iron pipeline,” and 52 percent more likely 
to originate in two states in the northeast with relatively weak laws, New Hampshire and 
Maine.61
Exposure to violence can heighten risk, since young people who adjust to a violent 
neighborhood in order to survive in it may ultimately be pulled into its orbit. Even in the 
American cities with the highest rates of gun violence the majority of city residents live in 
areas that are relatively safe, but in a small share of neighborhoods — often where poverty 
and other disadvantages are concentrated — gun violence occurs with dizzying frequency. 
Researchers who examined Boston crime data over a 29-year period found that just 4.8 
percent of streets segments accounted for 74 percent of the gun assaults.62 Intransigent 
pockets of violence also persist amidst citywide improvements in safety: while more than 90 
percent of New York City’s police precincts experienced a decline in annual homicides 
between 2000-14, the neighborhood of Brownsville was essentially unchanged, ranking 
second-most violent in the city in 2014 with 18 murders.63 Children exposed to violent 
conditions are more likely to succumb to a wide range of negative health and behavioral 
outcomes later in life,64 including increased risk of perpetrating violence themselves.65
Read about how  
Cincinatti, OH,  
addressed this  
on page 42
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Race, Policy, Community, and Urban Violence
White and black Americans may live in the same city without 
sharing the same experience of it. A recent survey of residents 
of Chicago found that black residents were nearly 50 percent 
more likely to say they or someone they know had been the 
victim of a recent firearm crime, and more than twice as likely 
to feel unsafe in their neighborhood.66 In a recent poll by the 
Miami-Herald, more than a third of black respondents said the 
most important concern facing Miami-Dade County was youth 
gun violence. In stark contrast, the top category chosen by 
white respondents was “traffic.”67
This disconnect reflects the fact that victims of gun violence 
both nationwide and in cities are disproportionately Americans 
of color, creating deep disparities in the quality of life for 
residents based on their race.
Although African Americans make up only 14 percent of the U.S. 
population, they account for a majority of gun homicide victims 
in the United States (57 percent).68 Black women are three 
times as likely to be murdered with a gun as white women, and 
black men are nearly ten times as likely to be murdered with a 
gun as white men.69 Indeed, black males age 15 to 34 are more 
likely to be killed with a gun than to die by any other cause.70 
Violence is the second largest contributor to differences in life 
expectancy between white and black males;71 overall, gun 
homicides reduce the life expectancy of the black male 
population by nearly a year.72
Part of this disparity is that more black people live in cities: 33 
percent of black Americans live in cities with greater than 
500,000 people, compared to 21 percent of the overall US 
population.73 But the disparities exist even within cities. In 
Milwaukee, where the citywide gun homicide rate in 2014 was 
14.6 per 100,000, among blacks it was 28.4, and among black 
males aged 15 to 24 it was 104 per 100,000 — more than 20 
times the national average.74
Violence in cities and race are linked in manifold ways, including 
the structural factors that also isolate a disproportionate share 
of black Americans in poor neighborhoods with low-performing 
schools and high rates of incarceration and unemployment. 
When Robert Sampson and William Julius Wilson examined the 
connection between race and violence in cities, they found that 
whereas most poor whites in major U.S. cities did not live in 
impoverished neighborhoods, the vast majority of poor blacks 
did — a trend they observed had only gotten worse.75 Of 
participants in a more recent study in Chicago, on average, 
even non-poor black residents lived in neighborhoods with 
higher poverty rates than poor white and Hispanic residents, 
and blacks as a whole were the only group with a significant 
likelihood of “compounded poverty” — being poor and living in 
a neighborhood where 30 percent of the other residents are 
also poor.76 Poor black residents experience a concentration of 
disadvantage that is simply not replicated for other groups.
Hispanic Americans also experience a disparate rate of gun 
violence, though it is slightly less pronounced. Hispanic whites 
are 2.6 times as likely to be murdered with guns as non-
Hispanic whites.77 A study of hospital data found that among 
men aged 15 to 34 across six states, Hispanics were 
hospitalized for firearm injuries at 2.6 to 17.2 times the rates of 
non-Hispanic whites.78 And for Hispanics aged 15 to 24, 
homicide is the second-leading cause of death; between 
1999-2014, 33,532 Hispanics were murdered with guns.79
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In an average month more than 50 American women are murdered with guns,80 deaths that 
are to a shocking degree a consequence of domestic violence. More than half of American 
women shot to death in 2011 — at least 53 percent — were killed by intimate partners or 
family members.81
The problem isn’t limited to cities, but can make up a substantial share of urban gun 
violence. A survey of 358 law enforcement agencies found that while domestic violence 
accounted for 8 percent of calls for service, on average, it was involved in 14 percent of 
homicides.82 Of murders in New York City in 2012, the police classified 18 percent as 
domestic disputes;83 in Philadelphia, domestic violence homicides made up 8 percent of the 
total in 2014.84
In many cases, guns play a factor in turning domestic violence into murder. When a gun is 
present in a situation of domestic violence, it increases the risk the woman will be murdered 
fivefold.85
To address the danger that guns pose in these situations, federal law prohibits abusers from 
having guns if they have been convicted of a domestic violence crime or are subject to an 
active domestic violence restraining order.86 But federal law does not address how to ensure 
that these abusers turn in the guns they already have — an oversight that can have tragic 
consequences.87
NOT ALL GUN VIOLENCE CAN BE EXPLAINED,  
BUT THAT DOESN’T MEAN IT CAN’T BE CHANGED
Changes in the gun homicide rates of America’s largest cities raise questions about urban 
gun violence even as they present a hopeful picture. Everytown obtained data on gun 
homicides from the 25 largest U.S. cities from 2006 to 2015 (see Appendix). Nearly eighty 
percent of them experienced a significant decline in their gun homicide rate over 
the last decade, and overall their gun homicide rate fell 25 percent. The variation 
between and within cities poses questions for researchers,88 but it demonstrates one thing 
definitively: gun violence is not a fact of life for American cities.
These cities vary widely in their geography, their levels of poverty and segregation, the 
policing strategies they have employed, and more. The way those factors contribute to gun 
violence is still poorly understood. Policing, in particular, has been the focus of considerable 
research and debate, and while there is no doubt it can have a strong influence on reducing 
urban gun violence, it is beyond the scope of this report to review the benefits and 
drawbacks of specific tactics. Researchers in other settings are working to better 
understand these issues; for example, the U.S. Department of Justice’s initiative Advancing 
21st Century Policing is testing specific policing strategies across the country.89
Read about how Dallas, TX, 
addressed this on page 48
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HOW THE GUN HOMICIDE RATE HAS CHANGED OVER A DECADE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CITIES
(COMPARING 2013–15 TO 2006–08)
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The intent of this report is not to explain the variation in gun violence in cities; its intent is to 
take what is most valuable from each of them. In New York City, where homicide fell by 85 
percent between 1990 and the present, from 2,245 at their height90 to 352 in 2015, 
researchers continue to dispute the causes, and this report does not purport to resolve 
those debates. But there is a consensus that New York City’s commitment to gathering and 
responding to data played an important role, along with a framework of strong gun safety 
laws. And the great decline in violence occurred over a period in which rates of incarceration 
in New York continued to fall.91
In other cities, gun violence remains stubbornly frequent, but this does not preclude 
individual programs there from succeeding at the same time — programs that could be 
expanded and incorporated into broader strategies. As such, this report separates the 
experience of cities as a whole from individual programs within them, assessing the latter 
on how well they work, not by changes in citywide homicide rates that reflect a much wider 
range of factors.
The cities highlighted in this report share a common thread in that they draw on data to 
guide their approaches, to measure the changes effected, and to sustain success. And their 
stories serve another purpose: in their victories, large and small, they demonstrate that gun 
violence is not intractable. It is not something that American communities must learn to live 
with. It is knotty and difficult, and progress against it might be slow or inconsistent — but 
progress is possible.
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A Decade of Gun Homicides  
in Large American Cities
One in four Americans murdered with guns die in just 30 cities. Data obtained from their police departments show 
that, controlling for population, their rates of gun violence vary — but also reflect some common trends. Despite an 
uptick in some cities in 2015, the overall trend over the last decade has generally been one of decline.
The below figures illustrate the gun homicides in each city per 100,000 residents, and compares that rate to the 
average of the country’s 25 most populous cities. In 2015, these cities accounted for over 3,400 gun homicides.
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Part Two
—
Strategies for  
Reducing Gun Violence  
in American Cities
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LOCATIONS OF CASE STUDIES IN THIS REPORT
Mayors, law enforcement, and community leaders have always been at the forefront of 
innovating to reduce gun violence. Across the country, they have developed and 
implemented a diverse range of strategies tailored to their own unique needs, and this 
report highlights more than 30 of them across dozens of cities. The highlighted 
approaches vary in the investment required, the population served, the groups involved 
in implementation, and in other important respects. Some are supported by an ample 
body of evidence, while other emerging interventions need further study but are 
promising because they approach urban gun violence in a coherent way.
This report does not prescribe any single program or tactic. Instead, it presents seven 
strategies, drawn from practices developed by dozens of city and community leaders 
across the country.
SYRACUSE, NY 
• Calling for microstamping 
requirement (p 43)
NEW YORK, NY 
• Litigating against gun dealers 
who break the law (pg 36) 
• Improving lighting around 
public housing (pg 41) 
• Crime mapping (pg 34)
NEWARK, NJ 
• Timely processing of  
recovered ballistics (pg 42)
PHILADELPHIA, PA 
• Greening Vacant Lots (pg 40)
WILMINGTON, DE 
• Epidemiological review  
of gun offenses (pg 30)
LANCASTER, PA 
• Requiring reporting of 
lost-and-stolen firearms (pg 38)
WEST PALM BEACH, FL 
• Training police to improve  
firearm identification (pg 33) 
• Protocol for processing  
recovered firearms (pg 45)
BALTIMORE, MD 
• GunStat (pg 45) 
• Hospital-based  
intervention (pg 49)
NEW ORLEANS, LA 
• NOLA For Life 
(pg 53) 
LAFAYETTE PARISH, LA 
• Love It/Lock It campaign 
(pg 39)
TUCSON, AZ 
• Requiring background 
checks on city property 
(pg 35)
GOLDEN, CO 
• Resolution calling  
for a background  
check requirement 
(pg 35)
BOULDER, CO 
• Responding to failed 
background checks 
(pg 44)
DENVER, CO 
• Crime Gun 
Information Center 
(pg 43)
DALLAS COUNTY, TX 
• Domestic abuser  
firearm  
relinquishment  
program 
(pg 52)
KANSAS CITY, MO 
• Crime mapping 
(pg 34)
CHICAGO, IL 
• Analysis of trace data (pg 33) 
• Summer employment  
• Cure Violence (p. 48)  
(One Summer Plus) (pg 51) 
• Cognitive behavioral therapy 
(Become A Man) (pg 50)
RICHMOND, CA 
• Violence interruption 
(Operation Peacemaker) 
(pg 48)
OAKLAND, CA 
• Requiring responsible 
storage of firearms  
in vehicles (pg 39)
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 
• Requiring responsible 
storage of firearms  
in vehicles (pg 39)
LOS ANGELES, CA 
• Outreach to  
lawful gun owners 
(pg 37)
MILWAUKEE, WI 
• Homicide Review  
Commission (pg 29)
LYONS, IL 
• Ordinance of responsible  
gun sales practices (pg 36)
CINCINNATI, OH 
• Focused Deterrence  
(CIRV) (pg 46)
YOUNGSTOWN, OH 
• Improving public  
places (pg 40)
OMAHA, NE 
• ShotSpotter 
(pg 44)
BOSTON, MA 
• New England Regional  
Gun Violence Summit (pg 33) 
• Outreach to lawful gun owners (pg 37) 
• Focused deterrence (Ceasefire) (pg 46)
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UNDERSTAND THE MAJOR FACTORS  
DRIVING LOCAL GUN VIOLENCE
Cities are engines of information. No matter how large or small, they generate data about 
gun crime and violence within their boundaries, from the characteristics of the victims and 
perpetrators, to the types of gun recovered by law enforcement, to the way the criminal 
justice system processes people arrested for crimes. Cities have continually demonstrated 
that by bringing this information together in new ways, they can take more focused and 
strategic actions to reduce gun violence. And by sharing that information, their unique 
experience can inform the actions of other cities around the country.
Review each homicide to understand why it happened and how  
that could inform future interventions
Different types of homicides are driven by different neighborhood and individual factors,92 
and the means for preventing future homicides are just as variable.93 To diagnose the types 
of gun violence afflicting them, cities can commit to fully reviewing all homicide deaths and 
the factors that produced them.
The Milwaukee  Homicide Review Commission (MHRC), launched in 2005 under the 
administration of Mayor Tom Barrett, brings multiple agencies and community stakeholders 
together to closely review every homicide and non-fatal shooting in the city. What began as 
a combined effort by the mayor, district attorney, and police department now includes an 
array of government agencies including the Departments of Corrections and Health. By 
producing a rich description of homicides in the city, the MHRC provides vital intelligence for 
devising gun violence prevention strategies.
At its outset, for example, the MHRC identified a concentration of homicides that occurred 
near or in bars. In Milwaukee, known informally as “Brew City,” taverns are a part of the 
cultural fabric. But some taverns were generating especially high numbers of calls for 
service to the police, and the MHRC’s data showed that in the first six months of 2006 ten 
disputes that began in taverns resulted in homicides, accounting for about 10 percent of the 
murders in the city.94 In response, the city adopted a nuisance ordinance requiring bars that 
had three calls for service for a violent offense to install interior and exterior cameras that 
would deter crime or capture evidence to sanction offenders.95 By 2014, tavern-related 
homicides had fallen 80 percent.96
The homicide review process also gives community members the opportunity to contribute 
their expertise and work directly towards positive change. Community based organizations 
such as block watches and churches regularly join government agencies to review closed 
homicide cases, and they consider how to supplement typical criminal justice responses 
with other local interventions. Later, both the findings of the reviews and updates on the 
responses are shared with the community at large. Establishing this process required that 
the police and other agencies build trust among the civil society organizations, and increase 
the communication and collaboration between disparate agencies.98
Most importantly, the review and recommendations it produced appeared to reduce gun 
violence. A U.S. Department of Justice evaluation undertaken in 2013 found that areas 
where the review was active at the time experienced a 52 percent decrease in monthly 
homicides compared to a 9.2 percent decrease in parts of the city that were not a part of 
it.99 What began as an experiment by a single city has since spread: the MHRC has 
conducted trainings with scores of other cities.100 
“The goal was to get a 
better understanding  
of what was going on 
with our homicides —  
to really help us think 
through what are  
the protective factors, 
what are the risk 
factors, what are  
some system issues —  
to reduce the gun 
violence we’re seeing  
in Milwaukee.”
MALLORY O’BRIEN,  
FOUNDING DIRECTOR, 
MILWAUKEE HOMICIDE  
REVIEW COMMISSION, WI97
BOSTON, MA 
• New England Regional  
Gun Violence Summit (pg 33) 
• Outreach to lawful gun owners (pg 37) 
• Focused deterrence (Ceasefire) (pg 46)
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Apply a public health analysis to local crime patterns 
Other cities have taken different approaches to diagnosing the local drivers of gun violence 
by employing the tools of public health. In Wilmington, DE, which experienced a 45 percent 
surge in shootings in 2013 compared to the two years prior, the city council determined that 
a new approach was needed. Recognizing that victims of gun crimes were often suspected 
perpetrators of later ones, as if violence were a contagious pathogen, the council took a 
natural next step and passed a resolution requesting an investigation by the epidemic 
experts — the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).101
CDC experts reviewed nearly 600 firearm-related arrests that took place in the city over 
more than five years, linking administrative data from across the city’s agencies and looking 
for patterns among the perpetrators, their prior interaction with city and state programs, 
and other factors that could explain their path to violence.102 The researchers then used that 
information to pinpoint risk factors that could identify those at high risk of committing 
violence in the future.103 For example, nearly half the arrestees (48 percent) had been 
admitted to an emergency room for a violent injury since the year 2000. Taking a group of 
factors into consideration and focusing on males age 15 to 29, the CDC was able to identify 
205 individuals who ultimately had a 66 percent chance of being arrested for a firearm crime 
in the study-period, and who accounted for 73 percent all firearm crimes committed by that 
age-group during the time.
The analysis demonstrated that by linking public health and criminal justice data, Wilmington 
could better focus its response to violence on the slim fraction of residents who needed it 
most. Wilmington and the State of Delaware have since formed a community advisory board 
to identify the best ways to act on the report findings and improve violence prevention.105 
Policy makers in other cities that adopt this approach may be able to allocate resources 
more efficiently and effectively, by focusing on the populations where those efforts are most 
needed and most likely to make a difference.
Improve utility and use of crime gun trace data
A disproportionate share of interpersonal firearm violence is committed by people who 
are prohibited from possessing guns but obtain them anyway. Because of this, it is critical 
that cities actively monitor how firearms reach their local illegal market. Cities can do this 
by fully harnessing crime gun trace data, which links each firearm recovered by law 
enforcement that was used or suspected to have been used in crime to the location, time, 
and circumstances of its first legal sale.
A basic step that every city can take is to adopt a standard policy of tracing all crime guns. 
This maximizes the value of crime gun trace data as an intelligence tool, by providing a 
more comprehensive sample of the guns recovered from the illegal market and thus more 
accurately reflecting the trafficking channels that brought them there. If only some 
firearms are traced, the true shape of the illegal market may be distorted or not apparent. 
In eleven states, state law or executive order requires local law enforcement agencies to 
trace firearms recovered under most or all circumstances.111
“We cannot arrest our 
way out of this 
problem... We need to 
engage the science  
or root cause analysis  
with practice on the 
ground that will bring 
forth healthy outcomes.”
RITA LANDGRAF,  
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT  
OF HEALTH AND  
SOCIAL SERVICES104
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Tracing the Path of a Gun
Since 1968, each firearm manufactured in or imported into the U.S. 
bears a serial number that, in combination with other 
characteristics of the gun, allows it to be uniquely identified. When 
law enforcement recover a firearm they can submit that 
information to ATF who, at no cost to the requesting agency, will 
attempt to identify the gun dealer who first sold it and ultimately 
the first buyer.106 That person may very well be the perpetrator of 
the crime, and even if not, they may be able to provide crucial 
information about the person to whom they transferred the gun, 
allowing law enforcement to “trace” the gun and follow its chain of 
custody until they reach the assailant. In 2015, law enforcement 
submitted more than 370,000 recovered crime guns to ATF for 
tracing.107
Each successful trace is a lead, and trace data are frequently used 
to solve gun crimes. The U.S. Department of Justice’s landmark 
study Following The Gun found that 29 percent of ATF’s gun 
trafficking investigations between July 1996 and December 1998 
were initiated through analysis of crime gun trace data, specialized 
records created when multiple guns are sold together as part of a 
single transaction, or both. All told, tracing was used as an 
investigative tool in 60 percent of the investigations.109 A typical 
success story comes from Montgomery County, Maryland, where 
detectives investigating a cold homicide case from October 2014 
recovered a partially dismantled firearm on the side of a highway. 
They traced the gun, followed the chain of custody through five 
subsequent owners, and finally arrested and convicted the killer 
two years after the murder had taken place.110
While each trace has investigative value, pooled together they 
describe meaningful patterns in gun trafficking, with diverse 
applications for focusing enforcement and creating a more 
responsible firearm market. Trace data may indicate that 
particular gun dealers are responsible for a disproportionate 
share of purchases of firearms that are later recovered at crime 
scenes, or that high volumes of crimes guns originate from a 
handful of buyers. Whether or not this indicates unlawful activity 
on the part of the seller or buyer, it can inform deployment of 
investigative and regulatory resources or spur gun dealers 
themselves to take steps to greater responsibility.
THE SHARE OF GUNS SUBMITTED TO ATF FOR TRACING HAS CLIMBED STEADILY OVER TIME, TO OVER 350,000 PER YEAR
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Mayors have also played a critical role in protecting access to trace data, and can continue 
to advocate for its use. Beginning in 2003 under the leadership of gun-lobby ally Kansas 
Senator Todd Tiahrt, Congress restricted cities’ access to and use of trace data, passing a 
series of eponymous budget riders known as the Tiahrt Amendments. At their height, 
these amendments greatly restricted law enforcement’s ability to share trace data, and 
while city leaders fought these restrictions and were successful in relaxing some of them 
in 2007 and 2009,112 the amendments continue to hinder the investigation and 
prosecution of gun crimes, by barring ATF from releasing trace data and rendering it 
inadmissible as evidence.113 City leaders can continue to demand that Congress repeal the 
remaining Tiahrt Amendments and restore access to this invaluable public safety 
resource, a measure more than 1,000 current and former mayors who belong to Mayors 
Against Illegal Guns have affirmed.114
Cities tracing firearms can also improve their tracing practices to generate higher-quality 
information. According to aggregate data published by ATF, 31 percent of guns that law 
enforcement recovered and submitted to ATF in 2014 could not be successfully traced.115 
This represents over 70,000 guns that were recovered by law enforcement agencies that 
year and submitted for tracing — but which were not converted into useful data to 
advance criminal investigations or crack down on gun trafficking. While some guns are not 
successfully traced due to their age or because their serial number has been defaced, a 
significant share of failed traces are the result of misidentification on the part of the 
submitting agency. Gun manufacturers are not required to standardize serial numbers 
and other identifying markings (in contrast to vehicle identification numbers on cars, for 
example), so a gun may bear a confusing array of symbols and brands, and an average law 
enforcement officer without specialized training and experience can easily submit the 
wrong information. For example, a recent study of guns recovered in Boston found that 
one in five traces by the city’s police failed because the submitted trace form had 
problems that prevented ATF from achieving a match.116
Require ATF/State Tracing
Do Not Require Tracing
TRACING LAWS BY STATE, YEAR ENACTED
2014
1998
2013
2016
1998
2008
2016
1999
1997
1998
2007
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The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office has taken a methodical approach to improving the 
accuracy of its tracing program, even as the agency greatly increases the number of crime 
guns it traces. Beginning in 2005 they began conducting trainings on firearm 
identification for their deputies, and ultimately offered the program to deputies from 
the surrounding counties. Today, every new officer is required to go through a four-hour 
training that includes sections on firearm identification and tracing. According to 
Detective Stephen Barborini, who helped develop and run the program, “When  
we first started we had 20 percent that were misclassified. Now we’re down to below  
10 percent.”117
Even in the biggest cities, the guns recovered by local law enforcement only represent a 
fraction of the larger regional flows of illegal guns, so another measure cities can take is to 
create platforms for accessing and sharing crime gun trace data more widely. ATF recently 
instituted a system for Collective Data Sharing, whereby cities that opt in can view data 
submitted by other participating cities within their state. The mayor of Boston, MA, Martin 
Walsh, took an even more proactive approach: after an analysis of trace data showed that 
nearly one in five guns recovered in the city originated in New Hampshire or Maine,118 he 
initiated a series of annual regional meetings to bring mayors and law enforcement from 
the entire New England area together.119 The group set a goal of establishing a regional 
center for pooling and analyzing trace data that would not otherwise be available to 
better understand trafficking in the Northeast, and is now considering measures that 
individual cities could adopt to curb the flow.
Trace data are also critical for educating the general public about how the illegal gun 
market operates and the role that lawful gun owners and dealers play within it. In the 
late 1990s ATF prepared annual reports for major cities describing the characteristics of 
their underground gun markets.120 The agency eventually discontinued the practice, but 
cities can reintroduce it. In 2014 the Office of the Mayor of Chicago issued an analysis of 
the city’s trace data, produced with technical assistance from the University of Chicago 
Crime Lab. The analysis showed that 60 percent of Chicago-recovered guns came from 
other states, particularly those with weak laws like Indiana and Mississippi.121 It also 
showed that four major nearby gun dealers (three in the Illinois suburbs and one in 
Indiana) sold 20 percent of guns later recovered from Chicago streets — 3,173 over a 
four-year period —one of which later adopted responsible sales practices to deter 
straw purchasers.
All cities are entitled to access and analyze the historical trace data produced by their  
own law enforcement agencies, and could potentially produce reports comparable to 
Chicago’s model. Cities are not constrained by the Tiahrt Amendments, which are riders 
on the federal budget and do not limit the activities of local government.
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Map the locations where most gun crime occurs
In any given city, a vast majority of gun violence regularly occurs in a small share of the 
city’s total area. A seminal analysis of the spatial concentration of crime in Minneapolis 
found that 3.3 percent of addresses accounted for half of calls to police.122 A more recent 
analysis of 14 years of official Seattle police data showed that between 4 and 5 percent of 
street segments accounted for more than half the reported incidents of crime; moreover, 
a drop in the city’s overall crime rate was largely accounted for by declines in a few places 
with previously high concentrations of crime.123
Over the last two decades the majority of police districts across the country have 
adopted crime mapping as a tool to shape where they direct their resources. With  
the emergence of the well-known CompStat model in the 1990s, New York City’s police 
department was among the first to map places where crime victimization was occurring 
with a high and regular frequency and direct resources to them. Locations of gun crime 
victimization and arrests were among the first indicators used in NYPD’s approach.124 
Similar strategies proliferated nationwide; in New Orleans, for example, then-Mayor Marc 
Morial implemented a crime-mapping approach as part of a broader information sharing 
strategy,125 and other cities have taken comparable action. A 2008 survey of over 170 
police departments found that nearly 90 percent were implementing some version of 
crime mapping to deal with violent crime in their jurisdictions.126 Of them, 92 percent 
measured their success by reductions in crime; 76 percent also incorporated citizen 
feedback.
Programs developed from crime maps have had significant impacts on gun crime.  
In the mid 1990s, Kansas City, MO, mapped areas of elevated gun crime and responded  
with additional patrols, leading to a 65 percent increase in recoveries of illegal guns and  
a 49 percent decrease in gun crimes, both statistically significant.127
Share data with community members and with other cities
Existing federal systems for sharing basic crime data between cities are antiquated and, 
while new systems are being developed, this deters them from interpreting their own 
experience in light of changes in others, and adopting lessons learned from their peers. 
Historically, cities have also been reluctant to share public safety data out of concerns 
about how the public will react, though hiding problems surely only further undermines 
the trust of residents in the long run.
Cities can now choose from a number of platforms for pooling their data. One example is 
the private company Socrata, which works with hundreds of cities to release all types of 
municipal data in an open-source format, including indicators of crime.128 “When most 
people think about violence, they care about what happens in the few blocks around their 
house,” says Socrata’s director of non-profit and philanthropic partnerships Cam 
Caldwell.129 Accordingly, beyond just making the data available, some cities produce it in a 
format that allows users to drill down to specific neighborhoods or police precincts to 
understand trends in their area.
Cities collect enormous amounts of data related to gun violence — from the time and 
location of individual crimes to the type and source of recovered firearms — and can 
more deeply engage the public in the issue by making those data available. Caldwell says 
an additional step would be for cities to set data-driven goals for reducing crime, and then 
hold themselves accountable for the data measuring communities’ real experience.
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REDUCE THE SUPPLY OF ILLEGAL GUNS
Once cities have identified how guns are reaching prohibited possessors, they can take 
action to reduce that flow and make it more difficult for these high-risk people to access 
guns. This need not affect the tens of millions of responsible American gun owners who 
safeguard the approximately 265 million firearms in the U.S.130 The number of firearms used 
in any given year to commit an act of violence or the recovered from a crime scene is much 
smaller, perhaps 500,000.131 Reducing the supply of illegal guns by cutting off sources to the 
underground market can ultimately reduce criminal access and misuse.
Require background checks for all gun sales
Each year millions of guns change hands in unlicensed sales, with no federal background 
check requirement, and many of these firearms ultimately reach the illegal market. While 
Congress has so far failed to close the loophole in federal law, states have taken action. 
Eighteen states require background checks for all handgun sales including six that passed 
laws since 2013,132 and in November 2016 voters in Maine and Nevada will choose by ballot 
whether to do so.
In many cities only a fraction of guns recovered at crime scenes were themselves purchased 
within that city’s limits, limiting the cities’ ability to close this loophole. Furthermore, many 
state legislatures have enacted laws that are known as preemption laws, barring cities from 
passing local gun laws, which hamstrings them from taking any action of their own.133 But 
cities have shown that there are still a variety of actions they can take to encourage 
responsible gun sale practices.
In 2013, Tucson, AZ City Councilman Steven Kozachik led efforts to pass a resolution 
declaring that the city will lease its property only to gun shows where vendors agree to 
conduct a background check before each sale. The resolution was adopted unanimously. 
The council has passed additional ordinances or resolutions empowering law enforcement 
to subject a person suspected of negligently firing a gun to a blood or breath alcohol test, 
requiring gun owners who lose a firearm or discover it stolen to report it to law enforcement 
within 48 hours,134 and asking gun dealers to adopt a handful of responsible sales 
practices.135
Where state laws preempt local lawmaking and prevent cities from establishing background 
check requirements for gun sales, cities have signaled their strong support for background 
check requirements by passing resolutions calling on state and federal legislators to act. 
One such city is Golden, CO, whose Mayor Marjorie Sloan still gets choked up recalling her 
attendance at the memorial for the 12 people killed and 70 injured in the July 2012 Aurora 
mass shooting. Limited by the state’s preemption law, but inspired by prior actions of South 
Tucson, AZ, 137 she led the city council to unanimously pass a resolution calling on Congress 
to act and require a background check for all gun sales.138 Riviera Beach, FL,139 Chula Vista, 
CA,140 Telluride, CO,141 Teaneck, NJ,142 Tucson, AZ,143 Tolleson, AZ,144 and many others followed. 
Mayor Sloan recalls only one constituent that ever voiced a negative opinion to her about 
the measure. The following year, bolstered by the support of communities like Golden, 
Colorado state legislators passed a measure requiring criminal background checks for all 
gun sales. The state’s expanded background check requirement has since blocked 
hundreds of prohibited people from obtaining guns in unlicensed sales including people 
convicted of sexual assault, under restraining orders, and prohibited from possessing 
firearms due to severe mental illness.145
“I am weary of people 
being afraid of the [gun] 
issue: there is no reason 
to be afraid of the issue.”
STEVEN KOZACHIK,  
CITY COUNCILMAN,  
TUCSON, ARIZONA136
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Strengthen oversight of gun dealers
When numerous crime guns are traced back to a single dealer, it may indicate he or she is 
contributing disproportionately to the illegal gun market, whether unintentionally or not. In 
such cases, cities have taken a variety of enforcement or educational measures to reduce 
diversion of guns to criminals.
In the late 1990s, the cities of Chicago, IL, Detroit, MI, and Gary, IN, conducted undercover 
investigations of retail gun stores suspected of facilitating illegal gun sales, and then sued 
those sellers who sales involved evidence of illegal conduct. An evaluation of the litigation 
found the greatest evidence of impact in Chicago, where the stings and subsequent 
indictments were associated with an abrupt 46 percent reduction in the flow of new guns to 
criminals. The researchers attributed this to the large quantity of dealers the city targeted, 
wide press coverage of the operation that spread the message to other dealers, and 
follow-up by law enforcement.146
Building on this, in 2006 New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg (a major donor to 
Everytown and a founding member of Mayors Against Illegal Guns) initiated an undercover 
investigation of 55 gun dealers across seven states. Trace data showed that these dealers 
contributed a disproportionate number of guns recovered at New York City crime scenes, 
and subsequent investigations found evidence of illegal sales practices by more than 
two-dozen dealers.147 The city ultimately sued 27 dealers who were caught facilitating illegal 
sales, and nearly all of them came to an agreement to change their sales practices. An 
monitor appointed by the court was granted the ability to train gun store employees, 
inspect records, and conduct undercover tests of their practices.148 A subsequent evaluation 
found that the number of guns sold by ten of the targeted dealers that were later recovered 
at New York City crime scenes fell by 84 percent.149 By 2015, the court-appointed monitor 
had conducted a total of 22 training sessions with the dealers, made 36 unannounced 
simulated straw purchases to test their resolve, and conducted 82 on-site inspections. After 
the settlement was terminated, several of the dealers opted to voluntarily continue to follow 
the sales practices.150
Even where gun dealers are not deliberately trafficking firearms, trace data may show that a 
small set of them are supporting the illegal market and induce them to take additional 
actions to reduce diversion to criminals. Many dealers are willing partners: a majority of 
licensed gun dealers are aware of attempts to illegally purchase firearms at their stores and 
consider illegal firearm sales to be a serious crime. In a national survey, 67 percent of gun 
dealers reported experiencing at least one attempted straw purchase in the last year and 
10 percent reported attempted straw purchases and undocumented purchases occurring at 
least once a month.151 Over half of respondents agreed with the statement: “it is too easy for 
criminals to get guns in this country.”152
The experience of Lyons, IL, a suburb of Chicago, is one such case. An analysis of trace data 
later filed in a court proceeding showed that a longtime local gun dealer had sold hundreds 
of guns recovered at crime scenes in Chicago, of which more than half were recovered 
within three years, a so-called short “time-to-crime.” This is a widely accepted indicator that 
the original purchaser bought the gun with criminal intent and deliberately trafficked it to 
the illegal market.153 This data motivated a group of city residents to file a lawsuit against 
Lyons and two other communities where major gun dealers were located, arguing that their 
failure to require several commonsense sales practices amounted to a crime against the 
residents of high-crime Chicago neighborhoods where the guns ended up.
Lyons could have fought to have the lawsuit dismissed, as the other two communities did, 
but they took a different path. The plaintiffs did not seek damages: instead, they 
recommended changes in how the towns regulated local gun dealers. The attorney who 
defended the village against the lawsuit, Burt Odelson, said that was the spark. “The lawsuit 
was really what got us thinking: could we do this? Do we have the power to regulate the 
dissemination of guns that fall into bad guy’s hands?”154
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Working with the Cook County Sheriff and the gun shop itself, and drawing on the 
recommendations made in the lawsuit, the village developed a set of requirements that 
everyone was happy with (including the plaintiffs, who dropped Lyons from the lawsuit to 
focus on the other two communities). Lyons’s ordinance requires local gun shops to adopt 
a number of responsible sales practices including a requirement that employees pass a 
background check, that law enforcement inspect the shop twice a year, and that the dealer 
install sufficient security systems to deter theft.155 The village also developed an unusual 
intergovernmental agreement with Cook County to participate in the dealer inspections 
themselves. The idea is spreading — according to village officials, as many as 30 other 
municipalities have learned about the ordinance, and are assessing whether it could work 
in their own communities. The measures resemble those that Wal-Mart adopted in 2008 
when they initiated a Responsible Firearm Retailer Partnership with Mayors Against Illegal 
Guns.156 
Experience elsewhere suggests the change in sales practices will make a difference. In 
1999, again using trace data, researchers showed that a single gun dealer in Milwaukee 
was a major source of the city’s crime guns, and had sold more guns later recovered from 
crime scenes than any other dealer nationwide. After this finding was publicized, the store 
abruptly adopted changes in sales practices to deter criminal diversion — in that case by 
dropping cheap handguns favored by criminals from its inventory. In the two years that 
followed, the number of guns sold by the dealer that were quickly recovered at crime 
scenes from someone other than the original purchaser fell by 44 percent.158
Foster responsible practices among unlicensed gun sellers
Responsible, law-abiding gun owners play a role in the safety of their communities because 
the manner in which they store and sell their firearms has an impact on the illegal gun 
market. Some cities have explored opportunities to educate gun owners on responsible 
ownership practices, with promising results.
Oftentimes, a city’s effort to educate and communicate with law-abiding gun owners is 
prompted by data that suddenly illuminates a problem. In the City of Los Angeles, after an 
analysis of crime gun data showed that many guns had been obtained through straw 
purchases at local licensed gun dealers, the city worked with partners including ATF and the 
nonprofit think-tank the RAND Corporation to initiate a “letter campaign” to educate new 
gun buyers about their responsibilities under the law, including the background check and 
record-keeping requirements of any subsequent sale.159
New gun purchasers received a letter during the state’s 10-day waiting period, before they 
had claimed possession of the gun, reminding them that the gun could be traced back to 
them if it was later used in a crime. While the longer-term impact on the likelihood of those 
guns being recovered by police are still under study by RAND with a grant from the National 
Institute of Justice,160 the intervention appeared to motivate sellers to take greater 
responsibility for lost guns. In an experiment that randomized the gun buyers receiving the 
letter and compared them to a group who did not, the recipients were two times as likely to 
report their firearms lost or stolen.
More recently, Boston adopted a similar approach. After an analysis of trace data on firearms 
recovered in the city showed that despite Massachusetts’ strong gun laws — which require 
gun purchasers to show a permit and submit a secondhand transfer record to the state  
police — more than 62 percent of firearms recovered in Boston from someone other than 
their original purchaser had been transferred or lost without notification of the police.161 
Acting on the analysis, the city sent letters to the 8,000 residents with registered firearms 
with details on how to lawfully transfer their firearm, and to offer a free gunlock,162 though 
too little time has passed to assess the results.
“Sometimes governments 
need to find creative 
ways to get past these 
hurdles. We understand 
the concerns the public 
has. We don’t agree that  
the store or the village  
is responsible when the 
gun is stolen or taken  
or misused illegally.  
But that doesn’t meant 
that we can’t find a way 
to try and prevent it,  
or at least to minimize it. 
And that is what we 
believe we did.” 
RAY HANANIA, 
SPOKESPERSON,  
VILLAGE OF LYONS157
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Reduce gun theft
By definition, a gun that is stolen has entered criminal hands. While some factors driving 
firearm theft are beyond the reach of known policy interventions, other can be addressed. 
Cities that have begun analyzing data on stolen guns have identified several measures to 
reduce this flow.
One measure many cities can adopt is a requirement that a gun owner who loses a 
firearm or discovers it has been stolen promptly report the incident to law enforcement. 
Timely reporting of lost or stolen firearms ensures that cities have a better measure of the 
magnitude and circumstances shaping this channel to the underground gun market. 
Research also shows that states with such laws are significantly less likely to export guns 
to other states, controlling for other factors.167
Beginning in 2008, after a string of shootings of Pennsylvania law enforcement involving 
stolen guns, dozens of cities in Pennsylvania passed laws requiring residents to report lost 
or stolen firearms.168 In addition to improving data about lost or stolen firearms, the 
ordinances give law enforcement another tool to pursue gun traffickers. As Mayor Rick 
Gray of Lancaster, PA, explains: “When a gun one of these guys bought and sold turns up 
after it’s been used in a crime, they like to say they lost the gun or it was stolen, but they just 
never got around to reporting it. This ordinance takes away that excuse.” 169 NRA fought to 
have the laws struck down and attempted to intimidate the cities into repealing them by 
enacting legislation that would give the group standing to sue the municipalities. However, 
courts found the NRA lacked standing and dismissed the case.170
Gun Buybacks
Many cities operate community-wide gun collection programs — 
known as “buybacks” — in which incentives are offered to 
residents who turn firearms into the authorities. These events 
are often successful at removing hundreds or even thousands of 
guns from circulation. It is also possible that gun buybacks 
provide other community benefits, by raising awareness of the 
risk posed by unsafe firearm storage in the home and by 
creating opportunities for community-members to dispose of 
unused guns. But there is no evidence that buybacks limit 
criminal access to firearms or reduce gun violence.
Studies of buybacks held in the 1990s in Seattle, Boston, and 
Milwaukee showed that surrendered firearms differed 
significantly from guns used in crimes, and participating 
individuals differed significantly from those most likely to 
perpetrate them.163 Guns were less likely to be the cheap 
semi-automatic weapons favored by youth offenders, and 
participants were older and reported few risk factors associated 
with firearm homicide.164
It is not clear that buybacks reduce household exposure to 
firearms, either; two-thirds of surveyed participants in a buyback 
program operated by Seattle reported retaining firearms other 
than those they surrendered.165
Researchers suggest that communities conducting buybacks 
adopt techniques to collect firearms more typical of those used 
in crimes:166
•  Offer monetary compensation for surrendered semiautomatic 
handguns, which are more commonly used in crimes, rather 
than for long guns
•  Require participants to show proof of local residency, to deter 
out-of-city dealers from using the buyback to liquidate 
low-value inventory
•  Establish community drop-off locations including churches and 
NGOs in neighborhoods with high rates of gun violence
•  Implement a sophisticated communications campaign to attract 
a greater number of potential participants
When Boston, MA, held a gun buyback using those techniques, a 
higher share of recovered firearms were handguns compared to 
an earlier buyback; a higher share of guns were successfully 
traced; and of those, a higher share had been purchased within 
the previous three years.
“For too long, cities have 
waited for Washington or 
Harrisburg to take the lead 
in the fight for the kind of 
commonsense gun safety 
measures our citizens want.  
This demonstrates what 
can be achieved when local 
governing bodies and 
mayors step up to take 
action on gun safety.” 
MAYOR MICHAEL NUTTER 
PHILADELPHIA, PA171
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A growing number of cities have identified guns stored in cars as particularly vulnerable to 
theft. Of cities for which Everytown obtained data, nearly one in five guns reported stolen 
were taken from vehicles — ranging from nine percent in St. Paul, MN to 52 percent in 
Hartford, CT (see Appendix). The number of guns stolen in this way can be considerable: 
in Phoenix, AZ, over the decade 2005-14, police received reports of 4,664 guns stolen 
from vehicles.
Where cities track data on gun theft this problem comes into focus and invites problem 
solving — and identification of the problem in turn encourages better data collection. In 
November 2015 after a rise in vehicle burglaries involving firearms in Lafayette Parish, LA , 
the Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee (CJCC) analyzed the data and realized that cars 
were the most frequent source of firearms reported stolen in the city, and more often than 
not the car had been left unlocked. In response, CJCC developed a ‘Love it/Lock it’ 
campaign to encourage residents to lock their vehicles if there are valuables in them, 
particularly guns.172
As part of this push to prevent gun theft, law enforcement also improved their data-
collection practices: in vehicle burglary reports, officers are now required to track whether 
the car was locked, says CJCC Executive Director Holly Howat. Beginning in January 2016 
the department started checking each recovered crime gun to see if it had been reported 
stolen.174 She says it has shifted the department’s mindset: “We’re not going to get 
everyone to lock their car, but we can make a dent in this, and there are some things we 
can do. They’re more open to trying to address this issue.” This is as an example of how 
changes in public behavior and law enforcement technique can build on one another, 
magnifying their collective impact.
Other cities have adopted legislative approaches to promote more responsible gun 
storage behavior that might directly impact criminal activity and public safety. On January 
19, 2016, the City Council of Oakland, CA, unanimously approved a measure making it a 
crime for firearms to be left unsecured in unattended cars parked in public places.175 Less 
than a month later on February 9, 2016, the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco, CA, 
unanimously approved an ordinance requiring firearms left in unattended vehicles to be 
secured.176 The ordinance stipulates that anyone other than an on-duty law enforcement or 
military officer who leaves a firearm in an unattended vehicle must store the gun in a 
trunk that cannot be accessed from the main body of the vehicle or, if the vehicle lacks 
such a trunk, inside a lock box underneath the seat or otherwise outside of public view.177
“We’re going to publicize 
[thefts] weekly and  
we’ll also have maps 
showing where the 
vehicle burglaries have 
been for the last week. 
We want the public  
to be aware; we want  
them to be involved  
in crime prevention.”
HOLLY HOWAT, EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COORDINATING COMMITTEE, 
LAFAYETTE, LA173
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IMPROVE PUBLIC SPACES
The environment influences individuals’ actions, and research increasingly shows this has 
implications for reducing gun violence. From the way a walk outdoors lowers stress and 
improves cognitive performance178 to how areas with a scarcity of grocery stores contribute to 
the poor nutrition of local residents,179 our surroundings — what researchers often call the 
“built environment” — change the way we think, feel, and make decisions.
With that in mind, some urban communities have adopted strategies to reduce gun violence 
by reshaping public spaces that facilitate gun crime. In Philadelphia, a local horticultural 
society is turning abandoned lots into clean green spaces, reducing the opportunities to store 
guns and drugs in those vacant areas. And in New York City, the housing authority is improving 
lighting in public housing, literally shining a light into shadowy areas where urban gun violence 
and related crime had been occurring.
“Clean and green” vacant lots and buildings
Vacant lots and abandoned industrial sites provide hiding places for guns, and can contribute 
to a sense that police and government are not invested in a community.180 Because these sites 
get little public attention or pedestrian traffic, they can also foster illicit activity, including gun 
crime, away from the watchful eyes of community members or law enforcement.181
Gardening and crime-fighting may not seem like a natural pairing, but Philadelphia and the 
Pennsylvania Horticultural Society (PHS) bring both to neighborhoods across the city each 
spring and fall. Working with neighborhood groups and city agencies, PHS transforms vacant 
lots (of which there are still over 30,000 in Philadelphia) into clean, well-maintained green 
spaces by removing trash and debris, sowing grass seed, planting trees, and installing a simple 
wooden fence around the perimeter. PHS and the city then contract with local landscapers, 
often minority-owned businesses, to maintain these newly created green spaces. PHS also 
uses the maintenance program to provide jobs to formerly incarcerated individuals.
The benefits go beyond aesthetic improvements.182 In a randomized control trial, researchers 
from the University of Pennsylvania found that these greening treatments were associated 
with reduced levels of gun assaults in the surrounding areas, a reduction that was sustained 
for years after the treatment.183 Another evaluation of the Philadelphia program found that 
residents felt safer and less stressed, and property values rose.184 Altogether, researchers 
estimated that every dollar spent on ‘cleaning and greening’ in Philadelphia generated an 
additional $224 in housing wealth and $7.43 in property tax revenues.185
A similar vacant lot greening program in Youngstown, Ohio was associated with significant 
reductions in homicides,187 and research on a public housing project in Chicago found that 
buildings with high levels of vegetation had 52 percent fewer total crimes, 48 percent fewer 
property crimes, and 56 percent fewer violent crimes than buildings with low levels of 
vegetation, despite the fact that residents are randomly assigned to the different buildings.188
“If it’s vacant property 
that can be accessed, it 
allows people to indulge 
in all kinds of activities. 
They can use it as a 
stash house for drugs 
and or guns. A lot of 
time these guys don’t 
carry guns on the street 
because they know 
we’re stopping them. 
They put guns in houses,  
put drugs in houses…  
it becomes a problem  
to neighbors and the 
police department.”
 LT. JOHN STANFORD,  
PHILADELPHIA POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, PA186
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Shine a light on high-crime areas
Gun crime benefits from the cover of darkness. Poor lighting makes it more difficult for 
witnesses to identify perpetrators, and may make residents less likely to report or intervene 
in crimes — after all, if you don’t see something, you can’t say something.189
Some cities are testing a simple solution: improved lighting in high-crime areas. By shining a 
light on shadowy areas that would otherwise be unwatched, these programs aim to deter 
crime, increase the likelihood that when it does occur it will be seen and stopped, and give 
communities greater ability to spot and respond to suspicious activity.
Public housing developments in New York City have higher rates of violent crime than the 
rest of the city, and over the last decade this difference grew larger. Home to about five 
percent of New York’s population, they suffered 11 percent of its murders in 2006, and by 
2015 the share had risen to 15 percent.190 So in 2014, the city launched the Mayor’s Action 
Plan for Neighborhood Safety (MAP), a partnership between the Mayor’s Office of Criminal 
Justice, the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), the police, and residents from 15 
high-crime public housing developments. The Action Plan aimed to address crime 
comprehensively, but one element focused on what City Hall and others saw as a critical 
need: enhanced security lighting.191
The first $1.5 million phase of the lighting project took place in 15 developments with the 
highest rates of violent crime, where the city installed 150 temporary light towers to better 
illuminate pathways, public areas and doorways while more permanent security lighting 
solutions were developed.
NYCHA is now installing new and improved permanent lighting, and in March 2016, the city 
announced plans to serve 40 additional public housing sites, where MAP worked with 
residents to identify areas most in need of improved lighting. The expansion also includes 
an evaluation, conducted in partnership with Crime Lab New York, which will examine the 
effect of different lighting strategies on crime reduction, perceptions of neighborhood 
cohesion, and fears of crime.192
Results are preliminary but encouraging. A year after installation, temporary lighting and 
other components of the crime reduction initiative were associated with reduced crime in 
the 15 pilot sites, compared to a slight increase in crime in other NYCHA developments.194
Outside of New York, similar programs in Atlanta, Milwaukee, Kansas City, and Fort Worth 
have been associated with reductions in crime, and several cities in the U.K. have seen 
similar successes. Ensuring that local residents are involved in the decisions about their own 
community can be an important component in the project’s sustainability and success. 195
“When we think about 
deterring crime, we 
need to pursue a broad 
range of strategies 
beyond traditional law 
enforcement. A well-lit 
street deters crime 
better than a dark alley, 
just as opportunities  
for work and play 
promote safety better 
than disadvantage  
and dis-connection.”
ELIZABETH GLAZER, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE COORDINATOR,  
NEW YORK CITY, NY193
“We’ve had a successful 
relationship with the 
staff and management. 
We’ve had good 
cooperation like I’ve 
never seen before. Staff 
has come out at night  
to refocus the lights  
so it wouldn’t bother 
anyone through 
windows… The City is 
actually spotlighting 
people, and now they 
know if they’re doing 
something, they’re going 
to be seen.”
MICHAEL LOPEZ,  
RA PRESIDENT AT 
WASHINGTON HOUSES,  
NEW YORK CITY196
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LEAVE FEWER GUN CRIMES UNSOLVED
Like communities anywhere, those burdened with high rates of gun violence want laws 
against violent offenders adequately enforced. Yet in the U.S. today, a significant share of 
gun crime — a majority of gun homicides in many cities and nearly all non-fatal shootings, 
not to mention the abundant gunfire that is not even reported to police — are left unsolved, 
the perpetrators unsanctioned.197
This leaves violent offenders free to act again, but it also undermines the legitimacy of the 
formal criminal justice system and leaves a vacuum where retaliatory violence by the 
community may flourish.198 As longtime Los Angeles Times crime reporter Jill Leovy observed 
in her 2015 book Ghettoside, throughout history and across cultures, where the legitimate 
authority of the state is not effective at interceding to provide justice, communities develop 
their own mechanisms to respond to murder in their midst.199 When people commit gun 
crimes but are not punished for it, and witnesses cease to see the value of cooperating with 
police, and victims become more certain of the justice meted out by the streets than by the 
court system, gun violence is tenaciously difficult to reduce.
A growing number of communities are adopting practices and technologies to improve 
how they investigate gun crimes, in particular by drawing from the physical evidence left 
at crime scenes or on discarded firearms themselves. This allows officers to respond more 
quickly to gunfire, learn more from the ballistics evidence they collect, deploy resources 
more effectively, and bring stronger cases against people who commit gun crimes.
Use the best available forensic technologies and processes to solve gun crimes
At the heart of every gun crime is a firearm and spent ammunition — physical evidence that 
creates a durable link between the weapon, the scene, and the person who committed the 
crime. A growing number of law enforcement agencies are embracing rigorous firearm 
forensic investigation practices to ensure they maximize the value of this evidence for 
solving past crimes and preventing future ones.
One leader in the field is the police department of Newark, NJ, which has created a thorough 
protocol for firearm intake and processing. They conduct a series of forensic tests of every 
crime gun regardless of its circumstance of recovery, including visual inspection for trace 
evidence, latent fingerprints examination, and DNA swabbing. It is not uncommon for a gun 
recovered without any apparent connection to a crime to be linked by ballistics or genetic 
material to crimes that took place elsewhere. Newark has also embraced the use the 
National Integrated Ballistics Identification Network (NIBIN), a digital imaging and database 
system that allows police to efficiently match ammunition markings to evidence collected by 
other participating law enforcement agencies nationwide.200 Where firearms examiners 
previously relied exclusively on a labor-intensive process of manually examining recovered 
casings and other ballistics, NIBIN enables them to instantly search a growing national 
database of casings recovered from other gun crimes. Newark has been particularly 
successful at eliminating delays introduced by these steps, so the information derived from 
recovered ballistics evidence is available within two days for investigators. As a result, the 
city has matched more recovered ballistics using NIBIN than any other law enforcement 
agency save the much larger jurisdictions of New York City, the Illinois State Police, Miami, 
and Philadelphia.201 They were so successful that the New Jersey State Police later 
implemented their philosophy of timely firearm intelligence statewide.202
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Another city pioneering improved forensic investigation practices is Denver, CO. Beginning 
in 2012, the city’s Crime Gun Intelligence Center — a collaboration between local and federal 
law enforcement — developed new protocols for processing recovered ballistics through 
NIBIN, submitting the gun to ATF for tracing, linking it with other sources of data, and 
returning the intelligence to investigators with the goal of more quickly identifying gun 
criminals. A preliminary evaluation of the program found that CGIC generated 27 arrests 
between the fourth quarter of 2012 and the end of 2014, and that there were fewer 
homicides in in the district where they occurred for two months following each arrest.203 In 
November 2015, after ballistics was tied to a shooting in Colorado Springs and then an 
attempted murder in Denver, CGIC worked with multiple law enforcement agencies to 
identify suspects in both shootings, and Denver District Attorney Mitch Morissey was able 
to bring charges in April 2016, more than two years after the first crime occurred.204
Demand that every new semiautomatic handgun feature microstamping technology
Microstamping is another technology that holds promise for further improving the value of 
recovered ballistics and for helping police solve more gun crimes. Designed for 
semiautomatic handguns, the class of firearm most frequently recovered from crime 
scenes,205 this technology equips the gun with a microstamped firing pin that impresses a 
unique code on each bullet’s casing as part of the firing process. Whereas matching 
ballistics currently relies on striations and other marks that can only be assessed by trained 
examiners and sophisticated imaging equipment, microstamping would greatly increase the 
accuracy by which recovered casings are linked to the gun that fired them.
In 2013, California enacted legislation requiring all new models of semi-automatic handguns 
sold in the state to come with the technology installed. Thus far, gun manufacturers have 
proved unwilling to introduce it, despite its mechanical simplicity and low cost. In New York, 
where the legislature considered a similar measure, the NRA blocked it five years running —  
spending more in political contributions in the state during that period than anywhere else. 
Mayors and law enforcement were at the forefront of efforts to pass the bill. Syracuse  Police 
Chief Frank Fowler made statements and testified in Albany multiple times, along with 
Mayor Miner. City leaders and law enforcement can continue persuading legislators to 
introduce and support a requirement that all new semiautomatic handguns sold in their 
state be fitted with the technology.
Use acoustic technology to detect gunfire as it occurs 
Law enforcement historically relied on communities to be their eyes and ears for identifying 
gun crimes; as a result, they only knew about gun crimes that were reported. But as new 
technologies become available for measuring gun crimes directly, it is becoming apparent 
that calls for service vastly underrepresent the number of gun crimes — and obscure the 
most precise means to respond to them.
Acoustic firearm detection is one new tool being deployed for this purpose. It takes 
advantage of the fact that gunfire has unique sonic properties that are observable over 
great distance. Picked up by sensors deployed across an urban neighborhood, the explosive 
noise can be used to geolocate the discharging firearm. Across areas where they are 
deployed, these systems have shown that typically, less than 20 percent of gunfire is 
reported to police.207 Law enforcement agencies are adopting this technology and 
integrating it into their practices so that officers can respond to illegal gunfire more quickly 
and precisely, even when it is not reported. By responding quickly to gunfire, police hope to 
detain a suspect or recover physical evidence more effectively.
“The technology could 
help police resolve 
unsolved shootings and 
shots-fired cases.”
CHIEF FRANK FOWLER, 
SYRACUSE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, NY206
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The technology also holds great potential for researchers, who have already shown that the 
data may provide a means for evaluating other changes in public safety practices. In one of 
the first studies to integrate it, economists Jennifer Doleac and Jillian Carr compared the 
frequency of recorded gunfire in Washington, DC across day and nighttime hours to the 
city’s curfew for youth under age 17 and showed that contrary to reducing gunfire during 
curfew hours, it appeared to raise it — possibly by emptying streets of bystanders and 
witnesses who would otherwise have a deterrent effect on street crime.208 And there are 
likely additional uses for this data. Forthcoming research by the Urban Institute and 
supported by a grant from the Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund will utilize 
measurements of gunfire across six major U.S. cities to assess whether surges in gun 
violence affect the financial health of neighborhoods within them.
Law enforcement are still working out how to integrate the technology with their practices 
and weighing the benefits against its cost. Initial reports suggest it is helping some law 
enforcement agencies respond more proactively and strategically to gun crime. After New 
York City began installing the technology, city officials reported that officers were able to 
respond to gunfire and collect ballistics evidence even when no call for service had been 
made,209 and in some cases to identify a suspect due to their timely investigation.210 In 
Omaha, NE, Capt. Kerry Neumann described how the installation of ShotSpotter data 
caused police to reevaluate where and when they deployed officers.211 In 2011, Boston 
police began bringing ShotSpotter data together with location data of probationers on 
GPS-monitoring to identify shootings suspects — resulting in nine arrests that year, as well 
as allowing them to exonerate a suspect who the overlay showed was not in the area.212 
More systematic data is also being developed: in 2015, the Justice Department awarded a 
grant to researchers at the Urban Institute to study how the technology is affecting policing 
in cities that have adopted it.213
Respond when criminals try to buy guns and fail background checks 
The background check system provides another little-tapped source of data to detect when 
criminals prohibited from possessing guns are seeking to buy them anyway. Every day 
across the U.S., dozens of wanted fugitives, convicted felons, and domestic abusers 
currently subject to restraining orders walk into local gun stores and try to buy firearms. Like 
anyone purchasing a gun from a licensed firearm dealer, they are subject to a criminal 
background check before the sale goes forward, and because they are barred from doing so 
by federal law, they fail those background checks and the dealers stop the sales.
Each denied background check represents a federal crime and in many places a state crime: it 
is illegal for a person to lie about his or her prohibited status on a background check form in 
an attempt to get a gun. Prohibited people actively seeking to buy guns represent a real risk: a 
U.S. Justice Department study of people who fail background checks due to criminal 
convictions or indictments found that three in ten were re-arrested within the next five 
years.214 But the denied background check is also an untapped resource for law enforcement. 
In an expanding group of states where state background check agencies notify local law 
enforcement when a gun buyer fails one, they can use this as a resource to follow up with 
these would-be gun buyers and make arrests when they determine a crime has occurred.
Colorado has a law requiring local law enforcement be informed whenever a person fails a 
background check and a law making it a misdemeanor for a prohibited person to lie on the 
background check form and try to buy a gun.215 These laws enable local law enforcement to 
prosecute these cases, and one municipality that has taken this responsibility seriously is 
Boulder. The District Attorney there, Stan Garnett, has been outspoken about the need to 
enforce these laws vigorously.
Typically, the state agency that conducts background checks refers those that are denied to 
his office, who conduct a factual investigation of each one, including an interview with the 
suspect, to determine if they committed a crime.216 If the authorities believe that criminal 
activity has taken place they will make an arrest; as of January 2016, Garnett said his office 
had already brought six such cases.217 In dozens of other states where local authorities 
conduct background checks, cities can initiate similar programs.218
“If somebody knowingly 
applies for a gun  
but knows they don’t 
qualify, that’s a 
misdemeanor, and I 
want to make sure we 
prosecute those cases. 
People who repeatedly 
apply for guns even 
though they aren’t 
qualified may be 
particularly dangerous 
people and just the kind 
of people we don’t want 
to get access to firearms.”
STAN GARNETT,  
DISTRICT ATTORNEY,  
BOULDER COUNTY, CO 219
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Increase the speed and certainty of sanctions for serious gun offenses
One way to improve the adequate enforcement of existing gun laws is to ensure that when 
a gun crime occurs, law enforcement officers are diligent in ensuring the evidence is 
collected carefully and documented thoroughly so it can be used in subsequent criminal 
justice proceedings. In Palm Beach County, FL, the sheriff’s office found that witnesses to 
shootings were sometimes reluctant to cooperate with the criminal justice system out of 
fear or mistrust, but many gun offenders with long arrest records were being identified in 
traffic stops in unlawful possession of firearms — and then slipping through prosecutors’ 
fingers because the stop and retrieval of the firearm had not been conducted with care. In 
response, they established a protocol for deputies to follow when making a firearm-
related arrest in order to ensure they are building a case that will be admissible in court. 
They put on latex gloves to examine the scene, document the location of recovered 
firearms before moving them, obtain a recorded statement from the subject and other 
witnesses, and fill out all the appropriate paperwork in detail, among other steps.220
Cities can also create mechanisms to ensure that the criminal justice system addresses 
gun offenses more swiftly and consistently. For example, in 2007 the city of Baltimore, MD  
began holding a biweekly meeting named GunStat. It brought together officials from local, 
state, and federal law enforcement, including representatives of the police, state’s attorney, 
and mayor’s office, who reviewed together all felony gun cases, pooling data from their 
various agencies in order to better understand where they were working well together and 
where they were dropping the ball.222 “The goal is to have the enforcement across the 
system be more targeted to gun violence and violent crime,” says Chad Kenney, who 
served as an analyst in the Baltimore Mayor’s Office at the time. “If we’re doing that 
effectively, we’re making better-quality arrests that have a more direct effect on reducing 
gun violence. So we can actually reduce enforcement and reduce crime at the same time, 
because the quality of the enforcement is higher.”223 Shootings fell substantially over the 
period that GunStat was operating, and between 2005-10 the number of arrestees 
released without charges dropped 68 percent, according to internal data produced at the 
time.224
Sheryl Goldstein, who helped build the program as director of the Mayor’s Office of 
Criminal Justice, says its essential elements include a core group of agencies that are 
totally committed to it; openness by all the partners to build trust and share data; and a 
full-time data analyst to shepherd the work. But this institutionalization produces what 
she sees as one of the primary benefits: building collaboration among diverse agencies 
who nevertheless share the goal of reducing gun violence. “In every other city that I’ve 
ever dealt with this issue, there is at least one reticent partner. And so I think having 
something like this as a vehicle to bring people to the table to improve relationship and 
outcomes is extremely important.”225 Similar approaches have since been implemented in 
Philadelphia, PA226 and Camden, NJ.
“It’s nice to make arrests,  
but you’re wasting your 
time unless you make 
prosecutable cases.”
DETECTIVE STEPHEN 
BARBORINI, SHERIFF’S OFFICE, 
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FL221
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FOCUS ON THE PEOPLE AND PLACES  
MOST LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED
A significant share of urban gun violence is committed by a small group of repeat offenders, 
often affiliated with groups or gangs. For example, in Chicago, a network representing less 
than 6 percent of the city’s total population accounted for 70 percent of non-fatal shootings 
between 2006-12; for individuals within that network, the risk of being shot was twelve times 
that of the general population.227 And in a study of Boston’s Cape Verdean community, a 
group of 763 individuals (less than 3 percent of Boston’s total population) were responsible 
for 85 percent of all shootings.228
Cities have used a variety of tactics to alter the behavior of these individuals. “Focused 
deterrence” programs, first implemented as Operation Ceasefire, engage a broad swath of 
law enforcement and community members to help high-risk individuals move away from 
violence, and they also create group incentives to stay out of trouble; the group is informed 
that if any member acts violently, all members will be targeted for swift and severe 
enforcement actions. Other approaches rely on civil society: “Violence interruption” 
programs like Cure Violence employ outreach workers (often older men who had served 
time for their own prior criminal activity) to intervene when they learn about conflicts likely 
to escalate to violence. And in some cities, programs reach out to individuals hospitalized for 
gunshot wounds, offering comprehensive services to help turn those near-death incidents 
into opportunities for change.
Intervene in group violence with ‘focused deterrence’
To address violence perpetrated by a small group of individuals already tightly connected by 
gangs or other social ties, many cities have employed ‘focused deterrence’ programs that 
create group, community, and law enforcement pressure to cease engaging in violent 
behavior.229 Developed in the mid-1990s in Boston by researcher David Kennedy and 
collaborators and since employed by a growing group of practitioners, successful focused 
deterrence programs change the perceptions of the highest-risk individuals about the costs 
of violent offending.
Like many of the programs in this report, focused deterrence begins with making better use 
of data. Law enforcement pool street intelligence and combine it with other criminal justice 
data to identify the individuals most likely to perpetrate gun violence—who are also at risk 
of being victims of gun violence themselves—and map the criminal ties that link those 
individuals with each other. Police meet with members of the most violent groups, 
acknowledge that their existing tactics have not worked, and notify them that the 
community is taking a new approach. If any group member acts violently, the whole group 
will now be subject to swift and certain consequences from law enforcement. At the same 
time, group members are offered social services and other support to move away from 
violent crime, and community members are invited to share the message that violence is 
not a community norm and will not be tolerated.
The model has been employed in dozens of cities including Cincinnati, OH, where record-
high homicide rates in 2006 prompted political leaders to bring together law enforcement, 
academics, medical professionals, local advocates, and other community leaders to found 
the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV). CIRV adopted a focused deterrence 
strategy and built on lessons other cities learned from previous experiences implementing 
it. The CIRV team was deliberate in building a sound, sustainable managerial structure, with 
the help of local executives from Proctor & Gamble Co. CIRV also developed a 
comprehensive social services plan, which earlier focused deterrence interventions had 
sometimes relegated to a secondary priority.230
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To identify the population that CIRV would focus on, law enforcement researchers reviewed 
homicide records, employed social network mapping, and used other techniques to monitor 
the complex relationships between violent groups and the individuals associated with them.
Like other focused deterrence programs, CIRV used in-person call-ins to communicate the key 
program messages. In the first 2.5 years of the program, they held 28 call-in sessions with 568 
violent group members. In addition, the law enforcement team completed 163 home visits to 
deliver messages to specific high-risk individuals under mandatory supervision.
Meanwhile, the service delivery team helped the programs’ participants learn to interact 
better with their peers and their environment and cope with anti-social behavior. They 
offered job training, intervened in imminent violent conflicts, and provided other services 
tailored to the communities’ needs. And the community engagement team conducted 
trainings and violence prevention programs, responded to shootings, as well as other 
outreach activities.
In the two years following CIRV’s implementation, gang-member-involved homicides 
decreased by 38 percent after controlling for potential confounding factors. Violent firearm 
incidents also declined by roughly 22 percent.
Similar focused deterrence programs implemented in Los Angeles, CA; Boston, MA; Lowell, 
MA; Stockton, CA; and Indianapolis, IN have been associated with reductions in violent 
crime of 15 to 40 percent in the treatment areas.231 In Los Angeles and Boston,  
researchers also observed reduced rates of violent crime in nearby areas that had not  
been specifically targeted, putting to rest some fears that crime was simply being  
pushed into different areas.232
There is some doubt about whether observed declines in crime attributed to focused 
deterrence will be sustained over time. In Boston, for example, after focus shifted away from 
gang-involved youth, violent crime rebounded.233 Some focused deterrence programs have 
also been criticized for imbalance in how they are implemented. A program in Baltimore 
under-delivered services and over-delivered sanctions, reportedly resulting in 324 arrests in 
six months but with no clear impact on gun violence.234
To be effective, focused deterrence demands full buy-in and participation from law 
enforcement, social service agencies and groups, and community leaders. Strong leadership 
from individuals can help make that coalition a reality, but if it is not institutionalized the 
program is likely to fall apart as those individuals leave or priorities shift.235
The success of a focused deterrence program also depends on a city’s police department 
and criminal justice system. If they cannot collaborate and credibly communicate the 
message that violent crime will result in certain, swift, and severe consequences, it 
undermines the credibility of the entire program.236 Credibility can also be jeopardized if 
police and the community they serve do not trust one another, 237 a core concern of the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing.
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Defuse conflicts driving the transmission of gun violence with ‘violence interrupters’
Upon returning to the U.S. after a decade treating epidemics overseas, Dr. Gary Slutkin 
observed that violence resembled an infectious disease in some ways: the more violence a 
person was exposed to, the more likely they were to exhibit violent behavior themselves. As 
he saw it, each violent conflict transmitted risk, as their victim was more likely to perpetuate 
violence on to someone else. And if those transmissions could be blocked, violence might be 
prevented the same way quick and effective treatment stops the spread of epidemics.238
Slutkin developed a violence interruption program in Chicago to turn the theory into practice. 
In contrast to focused deterrence, his program worked independently from the police, 
employing street outreach workers with a deep understanding of the interpersonal 
dynamics contributing to violence in their communities. That understanding allowed them 
to focus on the individuals at greatest risk of perpetrating gun violence, and often becoming 
victims of it, whether the factors that put them at risk were connections to a gang, a 
personal dispute, or something else entirely. In such circumstances outreach workers offer 
services and support including conflict mediation to reduce the volatility of the situation and 
give those involved a way out that doesn’t feel like backing down. The original interruption 
program in Chicago (now known as Cure Violence) and subsequent iterations in cities like 
Baltimore and Brooklyn have shown promising results, although the data is still limited.239
Richmond, CA, applied this approach in the late 2000s when it was losing one resident a 
week to homicide, making it the ninth most dangerous city in America by some measures.240 
At the time, much of the violence was believed to be perpetrated by a relatively small group; 
city officials estimated that more than two-thirds of the homicides and assaults in the city 
were committed by just a few dozen individuals .241 So the city’s leaders instituted a violence 
interruption program modeled on Cure Violence, though with an important twist. Under the 
name Operation Peacemaker, the city provided traditional services like violence interruption 
and mentoring. They also offered the most violent offenders a stipend if they participated in 
an array of social service programs designed to address their risk factors for offending, and 
refrained from further violent behavior.
The program employed local outreach workers to develop relationships with the highest-risk 
young men and their communities, and to identify a broader pool of individuals who also 
appeared to be at high-risk of future offending. Then the city offered them a deal: With a 
six-month commitment to stop perpetrating violence and to make other positive changes, 
participants could earn a stipend for a maximum of nine months. There was vocal 
resistance to the idea from some quarters, but the economic argument was compelling: 
since every gun homicide burdens the public with hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs, 
preventing just one homicide would essentially pay for the entire program.242
According to program founder DeVone Boggan, the cash incentives were a practical 
approach — the stresses of poverty were a driver of some violent behavior — but support 
services offered by the outreach workers were also crucial. In addition, the program built 
trust that was previously lacking between the city and the potential offenders.243
In the short term, crime data suggest the program has had some success. In Operation 
Peacemaker’s first year, Richmond’s homicide rate fell by 50 percent, from 45 homicides in 
2009 to 22 the following year, a trend that continued through 2014 parallel to a decline in 
overall firearm assaults.245 Based on these promising results, the cities of Oakland, CA, Toledo, 
OH, and Washington, DC have explored replicating and further evaluating the program.
“If we seriously want to 
reduce gun violence —  
in Richmond or any 
other city — it is young 
men [themselves]  
who must spearhead 
that transformation…
The stipend is a gesture  
of saying you are 
valuable, your  
expertise is valuable, 
your contribution  
to this work of  
creating a healthier  
city is valuable.”
DEVONE BOGGAN, 
NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY 
DIRECTOR, RICHMOND, CA244
STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN CITIES PAGE 48
Offer victims of gunshot injuries comprehensive services
A person admitted to the hospital with a gunshot wound is at elevated risk of further 
involvement with gun violence — either as a victim or an offender.247 In a four-year period in 
Wilmington, DE, for example, nearly half of those arrested for a gun crime had previously 
received care for a violent injury.248 Reaching such individuals with the right services when 
they are first injured could reduce their likelihood of subsequent violent crime. A growing 
number of hospitals respond to these acute injuries in ways that go beyond standard 
medical care, in an attempt to change the patient’s longer-term outcomes as well. By 
identifying high-risk individuals, providing appropriate social services, and leveraging a 
near-death moment as an opportunity for change, medical centers hope to prevent future 
violence rather than just treat its consequences.
An early, well-studied example comes from Baltimore, MD. Between 1999-2001, researchers 
at the University of Maryland randomly assigned 100 patients with violent injuries to one of 
two groups. All patients received the necessary medical care, but those in the treatment 
group also had in-hospital meetings with a social worker who developed an individually 
tailored plan for them. Those plans might include employment training, education, addiction 
treatment, conflict-resolution training, family therapy, or other services. After the hospital 
stay, members of the treatment group met regularly with program staff, parole or probation 
officers (when applicable), and other program participants. The entire program team met 
weekly to ensure that the many different services and agencies were working in a 
coordinated way.
The study was small, but the results were significant. Those individuals in the treatment 
group were three times less likely to be arrested for a violent crime, and six times less likely 
to be hospitalized for another violent injury. That led to lower medical spending: the total 
costs of follow-up hospitalization for the intervention group ($138,000) were one sixth that 
of the control group ($736,000). Finally, self-reported rates of employment were four times 
higher in the intervention group, with 82 percent employed versus 20 percent in the control 
group.250
Similar programs in other cities have also yielded promising results. A program targeting 
violence-involved youth admitted to an Oakland, CA, hospital found that participants were 
70 percent less likely to be arrested for any offense than comparable youth who did not 
receive the intervention.251 Programs in Chicago, IL, San Francisco, CA, and Indianapolis, IN, 
have been linked to reductions in reinjury, which likely indicate reductions in injury-causing 
violence.252 The San Francisco project, for example, was associated with a 72 percent drop in 
participants’ violent injuries over six years.253
While the hospital provides an opportunity to reach people at risk of perpetrating gun 
violence, a successful program must provide them with the right mix of services and 
enforcement. That can be difficult if some resources — for instance, substance abuse 
treatment — are low quality or in short supply. Another challenge relates to the way these 
services are funded; until these services can be reimbursed through health care dollars 
such as Medicaid funds, the programs operate somewhat precariously, often dependent on 
grant funding.254
“Trauma centers are well 
equipped to deal with 
the blood loss, tissue 
destruction, and death 
that accompany violent 
injuries, but they are 
not equipped to deal 
with the social ills  
that put patients  
at risk for being repeat 
victims of violence.”
CARNELL COOPER, DAWN 
ESLINGER, AND PAUL STOLLEY, 
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 249
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OFFER POSITIVE ALTERNATIVES TO YOUTH  
WITH RISK FACTORS FOR VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
While there is no way to know every individual’s path to gun violence, there are some 
warning signs that someone might be at a higher risk of gun violence involvement: skipping 
classes, acting out, committing less serious crimes.255 Reaching young people when they 
demonstrate those behaviors can put them back on the right track before they ever reach 
for a gun.
With this in mind, cities have developed programs designed to reach those individuals 
before they turn to gun crime, offering resources and specialized help to open a path 
towards a healthy, productive, and crime-free life. Two of these programs originated in 
Chicago, IL, as an effort to combat the city’s continuing crisis of gun violence, and both have 
shown promising results in preliminary pilot studies.
Offer cognitive behavioral therapy to youths learning to respond with non-violence
Everyone learns behaviors from cues in their environment, but reactions learned in one 
setting may cause trouble in another. A confrontational, don’t-mess-with-me attitude might 
protect a young man from dangerous groups in his neighborhood, but the same attitude 
will be detrimental to his progress in school or the workplace. To address that challenge, 
cities can support programs that provide cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) to help 
individuals adapt their behaviors to different settings deliberately, instead of reacting 
automatically. Early versions of this program have reduced violence among participants, and 
similar techniques have a long history of success in areas beyond crime, like helping people 
quit smoking.256
Since 2001, the Chicago-based organization Youth Guidance has pursued this approach 
with a program called Becoming a Man (BAM). Sitting in a circle, young men talked through 
issues with authority, school, what kind of men they wanted to become, and more. They also 
engaged in activities that teach them how to identify the way in which their thoughts and 
emotions lead to their behavior, and to regulate their responses. Similar programs take 
place in schools across the country, but what set BAM apart was the underlying strategy its 
founder Tony DiVittorio used as he led these discussions: Rather than simply listening or 
encouraging better behavior, he used cognitive behavioral therapy techniques to show how 
some behaviors are automatic responses (such as responding aggressively to a perceived 
insult) versus deliberate choices (thinking about the different response options and 
choosing one that aligned with their goals). DiVittorio’s program helped youth understand 
the differences in these behaviors, and increased their ability to respond adaptively in 
different situations.
Several iterations of the program have been formally evaluated with the help of University of 
Chicago Crime Lab. The first study included over 2,700 boys in 7th to 10th grade in 18 
Chicago public schools; one-third already had an arrest record, and the group as a whole 
was at high risk of failing out of school. The program had impressive results: after a year, 
participation reduced violent crime arrests by 44 percent, and other arrests (including 
weapons offenses) by 37 percent. Their school performance also improved, at a level 
projected to increase graduation rates by up to 22 percent.258 A subsequent study of a new 
cohort found that participation for one year again reduced violent-crime arrests—this time 
by 31%.259
CBT has shown promise in other violence prevention applications. Young people at a 
temporary detention center in Cook County who were randomly assigned to receive CBT 
were less likely to return to detention within the next 12 to 18 months than comparable 
detainees. 260 Programs in Washington State and Los Angeles, CA have improved school 
achievement and reduced involvement in the criminal justice system.261 
“They’re not teaching 
youth ‘Never fight.’  
That would be a stupid 
thing to teach youth in 
these neighborhoods. 
It’s just trying to teach 
youth to slow down a 
little bit, be a little bit 
more reflective rather  
than reflexive in their 
thinking, and just think 
for those, you know,  
five seconds, what  
kind of situation am  
I in? Do I need to tamp 
down this automatic 
response or not?”
SARA HELLER,  
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR  
OF CRIMINOLOGY, UNIVERSITY 
OF PENNSYLVANIA257
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Provide summer employment programs for students in high-violence neighborhoods
Cities intent on deterring youth from crime must offer them an alternative to move toward. 
While employment training is a popular idea, many programs have yielded disappointing 
results, perhaps because the populations they served were in need of more intensive 
services and support.262 But a rigorous evaluation of a program piloted in Chicago  showed 
that it reached young people at risk of participating in violence and significantly reduced 
their likelihood of violent-crime arrest over the course of the following year.
In the summer of 2012, the city of Chicago partnered with local nonprofits to roll out a 
program called One Summer Plus (OSP), which offered 8th through 12th grade students 
eight weeks of part-time summer employment at Illinois’s minimum wage ($8.25/hour), 
which would amount to total summer earnings of $1,600. While the federal government has 
funded similar programs in cities across the country since the 1960s, few had rigorously 
measured their impact on violence. To evaluate OSP, Chicago partnered with the same 
research group that studied the CBT intervention described above and used random 
assignment to enroll kids in the program. Those in the treatment group were assigned job 
mentors, and some participants also received a version of cognitive behavioral therapy 
aimed at teaching them to understand and manage the aspects of their emotions and 
behavior that might interfere with employment — the oft-discussed “soft skills” that enable 
success in the average workplace.
The program itself only lasted eight weeks, but the researchers tracked rates of re-arrest for 
another thirteen months. Chicago has a high rate of gun violence compared other cities but 
the results of the program were remarkable: youth offered jobs were 43 percent less likely 
to be arrested for violent crime during the study, a decline that represents about four fewer 
violent-crime arrests per 100 youth.263 And the program didn’t just keep kids out of trouble 
by keeping them busy: the reduction in arrests was largest during the months after 
employment. The researchers suggested that the job may have helped the youth develop 
more positive ways of interacting with others.
In the years that followed, Chicago expanded the program; by the summer of 2016, 3,000 
youth were participating, and the city recently announced a $10 million partnership with the 
Magic Johnson Foundation to expand the intervention further in the years to come.264
Similar interventions in other cities have also yielded positive impact, though different 
programs measure their impact differently; for example, a New York program didn’t increase 
employment, but it did reduce mortality among participants, likely because of drops in 
homicide. Other programs have been associated with outcomes like decreased 
incarceration, increased school attendance, and decreased violent, delinquent, or anti-
social behaviors.265
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IMPROVE RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Another group at heightened risk of firearm violence are victims of domestic abuse, both 
nationwide and in cities. The presence of a gun heightens the risk abuse will end in death, 
but fatal domestic violence is typically the final event in a lengthy pattern of abuse. So where 
law enforcement have proven able to collaborate closely with one another, share 
information about people at risk, and restrict abusers’ access to guns, they have saved lives.
Ensure that domestic abusers turn in their guns as required by law
While prohibiting abusers from possessing guns is typically a matter of federal and state law, 
cities and counties can take the lead on implementing those laws by creating a clear process 
for domestic abusers to turn in the guns they already own when they become prohibited 
from having them.
Dallas County provides an example. Both federal and Texas state law prohibit convicted 
domestic abusers and abusers under restraining orders from possessing guns, but there is 
no statewide process to ensure that abusers turn in their guns when they become 
prohibited.266 In 2015, a taskforce in Dallas led by Judge Roberto Cañas established a policy 
for firearm relinquishment in qualifying domestic violence cases. The protocol requires 
abusers to temporarily relinquish their firearms while they are subject to a restraining order 
or while they are being tried for a domestic violence crime, and to permanently surrender 
them if they are convicted.
In each case, the court assesses the defendant’s access to firearms, asking the defendant 
directly as well as reviewing any other information available to the court including victim 
interviews, law enforcement lethality assessments, and police reports. The defendant then 
has 72 hours to turn in all guns or, if he or she owns no guns, to swear to that fact under oath.
Because this protocol was developed and implemented so recently, it is too early to assess 
the impact on injuries, threats, and homicide by firearm. But the existence of the protocol is 
itself valuable as an example to other cities, counties, and states tackling implementation of 
these important laws.
Indeed, the Dallas County experience demonstrates how local jurisdictions are ideally 
positioned to enforce federal and state domestic violence gun laws. Cities can facilitate 
partnerships across their law enforcement agencies to solve nuts and bolts logistical or 
regulatory challenges that no single agency or group can address. For example, one of 
Dallas County’s challenges involved gun storage, as local police and sheriffs did not have the 
capacity required to house relinquished firearms. To resolve the issue, the county partnered 
with a local licensed gun dealer, which agreed to store relinquished firearms in its weapons 
lockers and provide office space for a sheriff’s deputy to oversee intake.
“The intersection of 
domestic violence and 
firearms is a deadly one. 
A workable response 
was within the grasp of 
my community so we 
had to do something. 
We strongly believe that 
if our gun surrender 
policies save even one 
life, then it is worth it.”
JUDGE ROBERTO CAÑAS, 
DALLAS COUNTY TX267
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ASSEMBLING A CITYWIDE STRATEGY
Every city has a unique set of needs and resources, and the diverse programs highlighted in 
this report show that there is no single best strategy to combat gun violence. But these 
approaches can be linked and applied together. One city that demonstrates this is New 
Orleans, LA, which for years has ranked among the most violent cities in the U.S. and 
remains so today. In 2011 Mayor Mitch Landrieu made addressing lethal violence a city 
priority, and in an effort to match a complex problem with an appropriately comprehensive 
solution, he initiated a series of changes including a far-reaching program called NOLA for Life 
drawing on many of the solutions profiled above.
New Orleans has allowed data to guide its understanding by adopting a homicide review 
commission process like that of Milwaukee,268 and researchers have conducted a deep 
epidemiological analysis of guns recovered after use in violent crimes in the city, similar to that 
of Chicago.269 Recently, the city took steps to reduce the supply of illegal guns: after a series of 
articles by the New Orleans Times Picayune documenting the scope of gun theft in the city and 
its contribution to the illegal market,270 the city announced a set of ordinances including a 
requirement that gun owners report firearms that were lost or stolen.271 The city’s program 
“Fight the Blight” targets the environment by combatting urban blight and abandonment, not 
unlike efforts in Philadelphia. The city offers greater opportunities for positive engagement, 
from midnight basketball to behavioral intervention to employment support for youth and 
individuals re-entering their communities after incarceration, a period when individuals 
otherwise pose a high risk of returning to crime. The city has committed to strengthening the 
New Orleans Police Department by connecting the force with the community it serves, 
targeting resources to where they are most needed, and responding appropriately when 
violence occurs. And at the center of NOLA for Life, the city has implemented a focused 
deterrence program to change the behavior of a small number of individuals most likely to kill 
or be killed, similar to CIRV in Cincinnati.
Citywide levels of violence are the product of numerous factors, and public policies alone do 
not fully explain why they change—or don’t. But gun violence across New Orleans has fallen 
20 percent since NOLA For Life began, even taking into account an uptick in 2015. And a 
rigorous evaluation of the focused deterrence program that compared trends in the city’s gun 
homicide rate to that of other cities concluded that it had reduced monthly homicides by 17 
percent, driven by a 32.1 percent reduction in gang-member-involved homicides.272
This experience demonstrates two important aspects of multi-component gun violence 
prevention efforts. First, it requires a deep and sustained commitment, even in the face of 
setbacks. And second, ongoing data collection is essential for learning, improving, and course 
correcting when necessary. Even the best interventions will face stumbling blocks, but a 
thoughtful and dedicated approach can keep a city on a path headed in the right direction.
STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN CITIES PAGE 53
Conclusion
This report has only scratched the surface of research available  
on gun violence in cities. And as diverse as the highlighted city  
efforts are, they represent just a fraction of the actions being taken  
by communities across the country. Nevertheless, four clear and  
practical lessons emerge: 
•  Act now. As documented in this report, cities are not waiting for 
legislators in state capitols or Washington, DC to respond to the gun 
violence that afflicts them. Some low-risk approaches like cognitive 
behavioral therapy, greening vacant lots, and improving responses to 
domestic violence can have immediate results. 
•  Act together. Collaboration is essential for greater impact, whether  
that means different agencies in the same city working to respond 
consistently to gun crimes, or cities sharing program data to help 
improve their respective implementation plans. 
•  Measure results. The examples throughout the report illustrate that 
better data leads to better decisions. The worst-case scenario isn’t 
testing an intervention that turns out to have no impact — it’s 
continuing to direct resources towards a failing program because 
nobody knows it doesn’t work. Data collection isn’t always exciting or 
easy, but down the line, it’s what makes the difference between an 
informed decision and a hopeful guess.
•  Don’t give up. Not every program will work in every city, and some 
great ideas might not be feasible given constraints on time and 
resources. But as the highlighted cities demonstrate, there are 
approaches that can make a measurable impact on gun violence.  
And for some residents, their city’s persistence in the fight against  
gun violence can truly be a matter of life or death.
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CROSS-CUTTING RESOURCES
•  CrimeSolutions.Gov offers a searchable database of crime prevention programs and 
evaluation data, including research on many of the interventions featured in this report.
•  The National Institute of Justice provides a list of web resources on gun violence. 
•  The Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence and the PICO National Network developed a 
joint report, Healing Communities in Crisis: Lifesaving Solutions to the Urban Gun Violence 
Epidemic, which reviews a range of policies along with a selection of programs targeting 
high-risk groups.
•  The Urban Institute, the Joyce Foundation, and the Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies collaborated to produce Engaging Communities in Reducing Gun 
Violence: A Road Map for Safer Communities, a report on communities of color and gun 
violence. 
•  The American Institutes for Research, WestEd, and the Justice Resource Institute 
developed What Works to Prevent Urban Violence Among Proven Risk Young Men?,  
which reviews evidence on programs targeting young urban men with known risk factors 
for gun violence.
RESOURCES FOR INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES
Understand the factors driving local gun violence
•  For more information about Milwaukee’s homicide review commission, visit their 
website or read the program evaluation report. They also offer trainings to interested 
jurisdictions as part of the Department of Justice’s national Community Oriented Policing 
Services initiative.
•  To learn more about the process behind Wilmington’s public health analysis of their 
violence epidemic, visit the website of CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence Service. 
•  The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives provides aggregate crime gun 
trace data online. The University of Chicago’s Crime Lab has experience analyzing raw 
trace data for more sophisticated analysis. 
•  For examples of sharing crime data with community members, the federal 
government provides a searchable catalog of datasets provided by jurisdictions and 
agencies (including cities) across the country.
Reduce the supply of illegal guns
•  Everytown has compiled information about the importance of requiring background 
checks for all gun sales. For an overview of the systems behind background checks, see 
Background Checks for Firearm Transfers, an in-depth report supported by the California 
Wellness Foundation.
•  To learn more about strengthening oversight of gun dealers, learn about the 
Responsible Firearm Retailer Partnership.
•  Dealers interested in adopting more responsible sales practices can examine the 
training manual that was used in the wake of New York City’s litigation.
•  For more on efforts to foster responsible practices among unlicensed sellers, see the 
letter Boston Mayor Walsh sent to lawful gun owners.
Appendix I: Resources
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Improve public spaces
•  For more information on national vacant land initiatives, including cleaning and greening 
programs, contact the Center for Community Progress. The Pennsylvania Horticultural 
Society offers workshops to city leaders interested in bringing a cleaning and greening 
program in their own communities. 
•  To learn about the evidence behind improved lighting in high-crime areas, see the 
Campbell Collaboration’s systematic review on the topic. 
Leave fewer gun crimes unsolved
•  The Department of Homeland Security has developed an overview of fusion centers, 
central sites enabling better forensic technology and information-sharing to solve gun 
crimes.
•  To learn about microstamping to link shell casings to crime guns, see the 
microstamping materials from the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence.
•  For more on acoustic gunfire detection and how it has been used, learn more from 
ShotSpotter.
•  Everytown for Gun Safety released a report Denied and Dangerous, an explanation of how 
and why law enforcement can respond when criminals try to buy guns illegally.
•  The Violence Reduction Network offers information about the GunStat program to review 
gun case prosecutions.
•  The Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office’s protocol for developing firearm cases is online 
here.
Focus on the places and people most likely to be affected
•  For more information on group violence interventions, National Network for Safe 
Communities provides an implementation guide, case studies, and other useful tools and 
data for interested implementers.
•  To learn more about street outreach to defuse conflicts, Cure Violence offers 
interruption model and research on the “transmission” of gun violence.
•  The National Network of Hospital-based Violence Intervention Programs offers 
resources for interested implementers who want to reach gunshot victims in hospitals.
Offer positive alternatives to youth with risk factors for violent behavior
•  For more on cognitive behavioral therapy for youth at risk of gun violence 
involvement, visit Youth Guidance. 
•  More information about the One Summer Plus summer employment program can be 
found online. 
Improve responses to domestic violence
•  Prosecutors Against Gun Violence developed Firearm Removal/Retrieval in Cases of 
Domestic Violence, a report on legal issues surrounding firearm relinquishment for domestic 
abusers.
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LARGE U.S. CITIES: POPULATION 
CITY
RANK BY 
POP. 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
NEW YORK, NY 1 8,250,567 8,310,212 8,346,794 8,391,881 8,191,853 8,287,238 8,365,903 8,438,379 8,491,079 8,550,405
LOS ANGELES, CA 2 3,777,502 3,778,658 3,801,576 3,831,868 3,796,290 3,826,423 3,861,678 3,897,940 3,928,864 3,971,883
CHICAGO, IL 3 2,806,391 2,811,035 2,830,026 2,851,268 2,697,319 2,705,627 2,715,415 2,722,307 2,722,389 2,720,546
HOUSTON, TX 4 2,169,248 2,206,573 2,238,183 2,257,926 2,102,421 2,129,784 2,164,834 2,203,806 2,239,558 2,296,224
PHILADELPHIA, PA 5 1,520,251 1,530,031 1,540,351 1,547,297 1,528,544 1,539,313 1,550,396 1,556,052 1,560,297 1,567,442
PHOENIX, AZ 6 1,510,609 1,538,431 1,569,917 1,593,659 1,449,583 1,465,114 1,489,531 1,512,442 1,537,058 1,563,025
SAN ANTONIO, TX 7 1,292,082 1,323,698 1,349,274 1,373,668 1,333,994 1,359,174 1,385,553 1,411,766 1,436,697 1,469,845
SAN DIEGO, CA 8 1,294,071 1,297,624 1,305,754 1,306,300 1,306,133 1,321,016 1,339,644 1,359,844 1,381,069 1,394,928
DALLAS, TX 9 1,255,211 1,266,372 1,279,539 1,299,542 1,200,648 1,219,399 1,243,243 1,260,725 1,281,047 1,300,092
SAN JOSE, CA 10 918,619 931,344 948,686 964,695 955,453 971,495 985,286 1,003,821 1,015,785 1,026,908
AUSTIN, TX 11 730,729 749,120 767,201 786,386 816,022 839,714 865,571 887,124 912,791 931,830
JACKSONVILLE, FL 12 798,494 805,325 809,891 813,518 823,334 829,543 837,444 844,014 853,382 868,031
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 13 786,149 799,185 808,001 815,358 805,825 816,239 829,691 841,138 852,469 864,816
INDIANAPOLIS, IN 14 792,619 796,611 800,730 807,584 821,671 827,346 834,520 843,375 848,788 853,173
COLUMBUS, OH 15 744,473 750,700 759,360 769,332 790,425 799,270 810,607 823,536 835,957 850,106
FORT WORTH, TX 16 651,808 680,433 704,299 727,577 745,879 761,895 778,728 794,055 812,238 833,319
CHARLOTTE, NC 17 652,202 669,690 687,971 704,422 738,746 756,204 774,969 793,951 809,958 833,319
DETROIT, MI 18 918,849 917,234 912,632 910,921 711,195 702,149 696,746 686,674 680,250 677,116
EL PASO, TX 19 595,980 600,402 609,248 620,456 651,676 665,503 675,829 676,791 679,036 681,124
SEATTLE, WA 20 582,877 592,647 602,934 616,627 610,298 622,175 635,063 653,404 668,342 684,451
DENVER, CO 21 568,692 578,789 593,086 610,345 603,365 619,390 633,868 648,401 663,862 682,545
WASHINGTON, DC 22 583,978 586,409 590,074 599,657 605,210 620,427 635,040 649,111 658,893 672,228
MEMPHIS, TN 23 682,024 679,404 676,660 676,640 652,597 655,975 659,727 658,508 656,861 655,770
BOSTON, MA 24 612,192 622,748 636,748 645,169 620,598 630,645 640,839 649,917 655,884 667,137
NASHVILLE, TN 25 586,327 592,503 598,465 605,473 604,843 612,243 625,318 634,870 644,014 654,610
SUBTOTAL  35,081,944 35,415,178 35,767,400 36,127,569 35,163,922 35,583,301 36,035,443 36,451,951 36,826,568 37,270,873
SHARE OF U.S. TOTAL  11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.4% 11.4% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% N/A
BALTIMORE, MD 26 640,961 640,150 638,091 637,418 621,317 620,889 622,950 623,404 622,793 621,849
MILWAUKEE, WI 31 602,782 602,656 604,179 605,013 595,064 597,435 598,768 599,503 599,642 600,155
KANSAS CITY, MO 37 470,076 475,830 480,129 482,299 460,651 462,035 464,472 467,253 470,800 465,378
OAKLAND, CA 45 392,076 397,441 403,188 409,189 391,716 396,649 401,867 407,667 413,775 419,267
NEW ORLEANS, LA 50 208,548 288,113 336,644 354,850 347,965 360,692 369,888 378,715 384,320 389,617
UNITED STATES  298,379,912 301,231,207 304,093,966 306,771,529 308,745,538 311,721,632 314,112,078 316,497,531 318,857,056 N/A
Appendix II: City Data
DATA SOURCES:
Data from the U.S. Census
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LARGE U.S. CITIES: HOMICIDES AND GUN HOMICIDES 
TOTAL HOMICIDES GUN HOMICIDES
CITY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
NEW YORK, NY 596 496 523 471 536 515 419 335 333 352 367 329 302 304 325 314 240 194 190 236
LOS ANGELES, CA 480 396 382 314 297 297 298 251 260 283 383 302 218 226 224 224 207 192 185 192
CHICAGO, IL 472 448 513 460 437 438 506 420 416 478 385 328 412 375 351 362 437 351 360 423
HOUSTON, TX 376 351 294 287 268 198 217 214 242 303 295 264 211 203 176 146 158 158 170 235
PHILADELPHIA, PA 406 391 331 302 306 324 331 247 248 280 344 330 278 245 244 266 284 201 206 236
PHOENIX, AZ 234 222 168 124 116 120 127 124 116 113 187 156 130 86 86 79 80 79 74 82
SAN ANTONIO, TX 119 122 116 99 79 89 89 72 103 94 78 79 81 61 47 55 53 46 93 81
SAN DIEGO, CA 68 58 55 41 29 38 47 39 32 37 48 33 26 20 13 17 25 19 17 22
DALLAS, TX 186 200 169 166 148 133 154 143 116 136 135 145 123 121 108 97 112 104 78 99
SAN JOSE, CA 29 33 31 28 20 39 45 38 32 30 17 16 17 15 11 23 27 23 18 19
AUSTIN, TX 20 30 23 22 38 27 33 26 32 23 12 13 18 12 18 7 13 13 14 10
JACKSONVILLE, FL 137 151 146 111 103 90 111 93 96 97 103 126 119 94 75 69 83 73 74 82
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 84 98 97 45 50 50 69 48 45 52 68 72 78 24 31 34 45 35 31 34
INDIANAPOLIS, IN 140 113 114 99 93 96 96 125 138 144 94 76 89 80 74 69 74 103 112 122
COLUMBUS, OH 102 79 109 83 105 93 90 78 86 78 81 61 83 56 78 75 75 60 73 64
FORT WORTH, TX 51 57 50 45 64 51 49 56 54 59 34 42 43 23 44 37 31 43 33 39
CHARLOTTE, NC 83 74 83 56 59 55 52 58 42 60 57 51 62 42 37 37 34 44 35 50
DETROIT, MI 421 394 342 364 308 344 386 332 299 295 322 322 290 306 253 298 333 272 237 276
EL PASO, TX 13 17 18 12 5 15 23 10 21 17 6 4 4 5 2 7 7 3 10 13
SEATTLE, WA 34 30 30 26 22 22 26 32 32 31 22 21 14 16 17 7 23 17 27 22
DENVER, CO 55 50 47 38 34 43 39 41 31 54 31 31 30 24 18 23 22 26 19 41
WASHINGTON, DC 169 181 186 144 132 108 88 104 105 162 137 141 141 110 99 77 58 81 72 119
MEMPHIS, TN 160 164 168 147 112 147 157 145 168 161 118 129 127 114 84 118 127 103 96 99
BOSTON, MA 74 66 63 49 74 62 58 40 53 40 55 52 50 35 60 52 40 33 37 33
NASHVILLE, TN 81 73 74 80 60 51 61 43 41 79 61 56 56 62 45 41 43 29 34 61
SUBTOTAL 4,590 4,294 4,132 3,613 3,495 3,445 3,571 3,114 3,141 3,458 3,440 3,179 3,002 2,659 2,520 2,534 2,631 2,302 2,295 2,690
SHARE OF U.S. TOTAL 24.7% 23.4% 23.2% 21.5% 21.5% 21.2% 21.4% 19.3% 19.9% N/A 26.9% 25.2% 24.6% 23.1% 22.7% 22.9% 22.6% 20.5% 21.0% N/A
BALTIMORE, MD 280 282 237 241 221 196 217 233 210 344 229 230 190 197 168 149 181 183 160 299
MILWAUKEE, WI 103 105 71 72 95 87 91 105 86 145 77 83 48 53 66 60 75 81 75 119
KANSAS CITY, MO 115 94 126 110 115 114 108 100 81 109 73 60 69 95 84 102 90 90 62 91
OAKLAND, CA 144 120 119 104 90 102 126 90 79 83 131 97 105 92 74 94 114 82 65 78
NEW ORLEANS, LA 177 217 185 185 184 210 204 160 164 174 157 204 174 163 162 190 185 141 150 159
UNITED STATES 18,573 18,361 17,826 16,799 16,259 16,238 16,688 16,121 15,809 N/A 12,791 12,632 12,179 11,493 11,078 11,068 11,622 11,208 10,945 N/A
DATA SOURCES:
• City data from police departments.
• Dallas, TX: Data 2006-13 were not available in electronic form and gun 
homicides could not be enumerated separately from total homicides. The 
number is therefore inferred from homicides. 
• Detroit, MI: Data for 2006 were unavailable and were estimated from  
total homicides.
• Indianapolis, IN: The Indianapolis Police Department and the Marion County 
Sheriff’s Department merged in 2007 to form the Indianapolis Metropolitan 
Police Department, so 2006 data could not be verified.
• Kansas City, MO: Data for 2006 were unavailable and were estimated from  
total homicides.
• United States: from the CDC Fatal Injury Reports, excludes legal intervention
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LARGE U.S. CITIES: GUN HOMICIDE AND NON-GUN HOMICIDE RATES 
GUN HOMICIDES PER 100,000 RESIDENTS NON-GUN HOMICIDES PER 100,000 RESIDENTS
CITY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
NEW YORK, NY 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.6 4.0 3.8 2.9 2.3 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.0 2.6 2.0 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.4
LOS ANGELES, CA 10.1 8.0 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.4 4.9 4.7 4.8 2.6 2.5 4.3 2.3 1.9 1.9 2.4 1.5 1.9 2.3
CHICAGO, IL 13.7 11.7 14.6 13.2 13.0 13.4 16.1 12.9 13.2 15.5 3.1 4.3 3.6 3.0 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.0
HOUSTON, TX 13.6 12.0 9.4 9.0 8.4 6.9 7.3 7.2 7.6 10.2 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.7 4.4 2.4 2.7 2.5 3.2 3.0
PHILADELPHIA, PA 22.6 21.6 18.0 15.8 16.0 17.3 18.3 12.9 13.2 15.1 4.1 4.0 3.4 3.7 4.1 3.8 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.8
PHOENIX, AZ 12.4 10.1 8.3 5.4 5.9 5.4 5.4 5.2 4.8 5.2 3.1 4.3 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.8 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.0
SAN ANTONIO, TX 6.0 6.0 6.0 4.4 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.3 6.5 5.5 3.2 3.2 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.6 1.8 0.7 0.9
SAN DIEGO, CA 3.7 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.9 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.1
DALLAS, TX 10.8 11.5 9.6 9.3 9.0 7.9 9.0 8.2 6.1 7.6 4.0 4.3 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.0 3.4 3.1 3.0 2.9
SAN JOSE, CA 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.2 2.4 2.7 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.3 1.8 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.1
AUSTIN, TX 1.6 1.7 2.3 1.5 2.2 0.8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.1 2.3 0.7 1.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 1.5 2.0 1.4
JACKSONVILLE, FL 12.9 15.6 14.7 11.6 9.1 8.3 9.9 8.6 8.7 9.4 4.3 3.1 3.3 2.1 3.4 2.5 3.3 2.4 2.6 1.8
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 8.6 9.0 9.7 2.9 3.8 4.2 5.4 4.2 3.6 3.9 2.0 3.3 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.0 2.9 1.5 1.6 2.1
INDIANAPOLIS, IN 11.9 9.5 11.1 9.9 9.0 8.3 8.9 12.2 13.2 14.3 5.8 4.6 3.1 2.4 2.3 3.3 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.6
COLUMBUS, OH 10.9 8.1 10.9 7.3 9.9 9.4 9.3 7.3 8.7 7.5 2.8 2.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 2.3 1.9 2.2 1.6 1.7
FORT WORTH, TX 5.2 6.2 6.1 3.2 5.9 4.9 4.0 5.4 4.1 4.7 2.6 2.2 1.0 3.0 2.7 1.8 2.3 1.6 2.6 2.5
CHARLOTTE, NC 8.7 7.6 9.0 6.0 5.0 4.9 4.4 5.5 4.3 6.0 4.0 3.4 3.1 2.0 3.0 2.4 2.3 1.8 0.9 1.2
DETROIT, MI 35.0 35.1 31.8 33.6 35.6 42.4 47.8 39.6 34.8 40.8 10.8 7.8 5.7 6.4 7.7 6.6 7.6 8.7 9.1 2.8
EL PASO, TX 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.3 1.1 1.0 0.4 1.5 1.9 1.2 2.2 2.3 1.1 0.5 1.2 2.4 1.0 1.6 0.6
SEATTLE, WA 3.8 3.5 2.3 2.6 2.8 1.1 3.6 2.6 4.0 3.2 2.1 1.5 2.7 1.6 0.8 2.4 0.5 2.3 0.7 1.3
DENVER, CO 5.5 5.4 5.1 3.9 3.0 3.7 3.5 4.0 2.9 6.0 4.2 3.3 2.9 2.3 2.7 3.2 2.7 2.3 1.8 2.0
WASHINGTON, DC 23.5 24.0 23.9 18.3 16.4 12.4 9.1 12.5 10.9 17.7 5.5 6.8 7.6 5.7 5.5 5.0 4.7 3.5 5.0 6.5
MEMPHIS, TN 17.3 19.0 18.8 16.8 12.9 18.0 19.3 15.6 14.6 15.1 6.2 5.2 6.1 4.9 4.3 4.4 4.5 6.4 11.0 9.4
BOSTON, MA 9.0 8.4 7.9 5.4 9.7 8.2 6.2 5.1 5.6 4.9 3.1 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.3 1.6 2.8 1.1 2.4 1.1
NASHVILLE, TN 10.4 9.5 9.4 10.2 7.4 6.7 6.9 4.6 5.3 9.3 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.5 1.6 2.9 2.2 1.1 2.8
SUBTOTAL 9.8 9.0 8.4 7.4 7.2 7.1 7.3 6.3 6.2 7.2 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.6 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.1
BALTIMORE, MD 35.7 35.9 29.8 30.9 27.0 24.0 29.1 29.4 25.7 48.1 8.0 8.1 7.4 6.9 8.5 7.6 5.8 8.0 8.0 7.2
MILWAUKEE, WI 12.8 13.8 7.9 8.8 11.1 10.0 12.5 13.5 12.5 19.8 4.3 3.7 3.8 3.1 4.9 4.5 2.7 4.0 1.8 4.3
KANSAS CITY, MO 15.6 12.6 14.4 19.7 18.2 22.1 19.4 19.3 13.2 19.6 8.8 7.1 11.9 3.1 6.7 2.6 3.9 2.1 4.0 3.8
OAKLAND, CA 33.4 24.4 26.0 22.5 18.9 23.7 28.4 20.1 15.7 18.6 3.3 5.8 3.5 2.9 4.1 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.4 1.2
NEW ORLEANS, LA 75.3 70.8 51.7 45.9 46.6 52.7 50.0 37.2 39.0 40.8 9.6 4.5 3.3 6.2 6.3 5.5 5.1 5.0 3.6 3.9
UNITED STATES 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.4 N/A 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 N/A
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LARGE U.S. CITIES: GUNS SUBMITTED TO ATF FOR TRACING 
GUNS SUBMITTED FOR TRACING GUNS SUBMITTED FOR TRACING PER 100,000 RESIDENTS
CITY 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2006-14 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2006-14
NEW YORK, NY 7,068 6,060 6,134 5,349 4,526 3,980 3,928 4,022 3,552 44,619 86 73 73 64 55 48 47 48 42 60
LOS ANGELES, CA 3,334 3,591 5,383 6,440 5,330 6,150 5,645 4,709 4,864 45,446 88 95 142 168 140 161 146 121 124 132
CHICAGO, IL 8,367 6,690 6,300 7,040 6,515 6,023 5,802 5,118 6,429 58,284 298 238 223 247 242 223 214 188 236 234
HOUSTON, TX 4,652 3,820 4,910 4,306 4,284 3,038 1,812 2,241 3,450 32,513 214 173 219 191 204 143 84 102 154 165
PHILADELPHIA, PA 4,988 4,813 5,068 3,992 4,047 4,157 3,834 3,513 3,187 37,599 328 315 329 258 265 270 247 226 204 271
PHOENIX, AZ 4,910 5,507 5,022 4,823 4,486 3,740 4,172 1,993 2,686 37,339 325 358 320 303 309 255 280 132 175 273
SAN ANTONIO, TX 247 357 294 294 276 279 298 321 377 2,743 19 27 22 21 21 21 22 23 26 22
SAN DIEGO, CA 477 821 1,228 1,130 816 845 904 877 838 7,936 37 63 94 87 62 64 67 64 61 67
DALLAS, TX 3,394 3,358 3,516 3,582 3,257 2,463 2,324 2,625 2,453 26,972 270 265 275 276 271 202 187 208 191 238
SAN JOSE, CA  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
AUSTIN, TX  266  256 189 214 263 683 1,046 2,917  N/A 36 N/A 33 23 25 30 77 115 48
JACKSONVILLE, FL 2,835 3,128 3,049 2,664 2,369 2,155 1,965 1,813 1,917 21,895 355 388 376 327 288 260 235 215 225 297
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 898 1,015 1,072 985 771  459 462 687 6,349 114 127 133 121 96 N/A 55 55 81 98
INDIANAPOLIS, IN 3,448 3,291 3,509 3,288 3,091 3,038 2,820 3,002 2,655 28,142 435 413 438 407 376 367 338 356 313 383
COLUMBUS, OH 1,783 2,281 2,214 2,309 2,462 2,307 2,517 2,438 2,263 20,574 239 304 292 300 311 289 311 296 271 290
FORT WORTH, TX 786 779 463 N/A 198 N/A  N/A 252 386 2,864 121 114 66 N/A 27 N/A N/A 32 48 68
CHARLOTTE, NC 2,275 2,428 2,134 1,764 1,820 1,663 1,981 1,948 1,878 17,891 349 363 310 250 246 220 256 245 232 275
DETROIT, MI 3,603 3,970 3,863 3,963 4,137 3,379 2,591 3,913 3,601 33,020 392 433 423 435 582 481 372 570 529 469
EL PASO, TX N/A  N/A 264 N/A 204 N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 468 N/A  N/A 43 N/A 31 N/A  N/A  N/A N/A 37
SEATTLE, WA 845 725 749 677 604 569 593 500 394 5,656 145 122 124 110 99 91 93 77 59 102
DENVER, CO 362 628 741 645 672 740 787 1,126 1,021 6,722 64 109 125 106 111 119 124 174 154 121
WASHINGTON, DC 1,831 1,754 1,951 1,714 1,545 1,421 1,419 1,331 1,345 14,311 314 299 331 286 255 229 223 205 204 261
MEMPHIS, TN 406 136 3,558 175 853 103 2,413 1,997 1,172 10,813 60 20 526 26 131 16 366 303 178 181
BOSTON, MA 554 511 492 488 557 497 437 540 598 4,674 90 82 77 76 90 79 68 83 91 82
NASHVILLE, TN 1,354 1,511 1,503 1,075 1,027 522 204 1,667 772 9,635 231 255 251 178 170 85 33 263 120 176
SUBTOTAL 58,417 57,440 63,417 56,959 54,036 47,283 47,168 47,091 47,571 479,382 167 162 177 158 154 133 131 129 129 149
BALTIMORE, MD 2,895 3,513 2,828 2,720 2,548 2,356 2,168 2,181 2,031 23,240 452 549 443 427 410 379 348 350 326 409
MILWAUKEE, WI 2,474 2,625 2,169 2,110 1,770 1,723 1,802 1,737 1,980 18,390 410 436 359 349 297 288 301 290 330 340
KANSAS CITY, MO 864 1,414 953 1,220 1,203 717 863 884 1,351 9,469 184 297 198 253 261 155 186 189 287 223
OAKLAND, CA 1,150 1,487 1,343 1,169 1,059 894 648 494 1,116 9,360 293 374 333 286 270 225 161 121 270 259
NEW ORLEANS, LA 2,180 2,181 2,315 1,975 1,826 1,665 1,615 1,374 1,323 16,454 1,045 757 688 557 525 462 437 363 344 575
DATA SOURCES:
Data from ATF.gov 
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CITIES WITH POPULATION 1 MILLION OR MORE IN THE U.S., U.K., CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND: HOMICIDES AND HOMICIDE RATES 
HOMICIDES HOMICIDES PER 100,000 RESIDENTS
CITY COUNTRY 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 AVERAGE 2010-14
PHILADELPHIA USA 377 407 392 331 302 306 324 331 247 248 24.8 26.8 25.6 21.5 19.5 20.0 21.0 21.3 15.9 15.9 18.8
CHICAGO USA 448 468 443 510 458 432 431 506 420 416 15.9 16.7 15.8 18.0 16.1 16.0 15.9 18.6 15.4 15.3 16.3
DALLAS USA 202 187 200 170 166 148 133 152 143 116 16.2 14.9 15.8 13.3 12.8 12.3 10.9 12.2 11.3 9.1 11.2
HOUSTON USA 334 377 351 294 287 269 198 217 214 242 16.1 17.4 15.9 13.1 12.7 12.8 9.3 10.0 9.7 10.8 10.5
PHOENIX USA 220 235 212 167 122 116 116 127 124 116 15.0 15.6 13.8 10.6 7.7 8.0 7.9 8.5 8.2 7.5 8.0
LOS ANGELES USA 489 480 395 384 312 293 297 301 251 260 12.9 12.7 10.5 10.1 8.1 7.7 7.8 7.8 6.4 6.6 7.3
SAN ANTONIO USA 86 119 122 116 99 79 89 92 72 103 6.8 9.2 9.2 8.6 7.2 5.9 6.5 6.6 5.1 7.2 6.3
NEW YORK CITY USA 539 596 496 523 471 536 515 414 335 333 6.6 7.2 6.0 6.3 5.6 6.5 6.2 4.9 4.0 3.9 5.1
SAN DIEGO USA 51 68 59 55 41 29 38 48 39 32 4.0 5.3 4.5 4.2 3.1 2.2 2.9 3.6 2.9 2.3 2.8
BIRMINGHAM UK 23 24 16 30 15 19 19 22 22 17 2.3 2.4 1.6 2.9 1.4 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.8
CALGARY Canada 25 26 36 34 25 15 14 19 24 31 2.3 2.3 3.1 2.9 2.0 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.8 2.2 1.5
LONDON UK 177 160 161 155 118 133 100 109 108 102 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.4
TORONTO Canada 104 98 112 103 90 81 86 80 80 83 1.98 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
MONTREAL Canada 48 52 59 48 44 51 54 47 43 39 1.31 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.2
SYDNEY Australia 51 62 49 45 53 49 53 45 61 45 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.1
AUCKLAND New Zealand 19 23 11 19 14 18 14 10 11 20 1.4 1.6 0.8 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.3 1.0
BRISBANE Australia 18 21 25 21 23 14 18 23 16 21 0.93 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.8
DATA SOURCES:
• Montreal, Calgary, Toronto: Statistics Canada, Homicide Survey, Canadian 
Centre for Justice Statistics. Homicide includes Criminal Code offences of murder, 
manslaughter and infanticide.
• Brisbane: South Eastern Queensland (Brisbane and South Eastern Police Region 
Combined). Homicide (murder)
• Greater Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research
• London: Crime Statistics Programme | Crime and Policing Statistics, Home Office. 
The data for London runs for a financial year eg 1st April 2011-31st March 2012.
• Auckland: Statistics New Zealand
• Birmingham: West Midlands Police Recorded C.R.I.M.E Homicides. Data are 
2005/6 - 2012/13
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U.S. CITIES: GUNS REPORTED LOST OR STOLEN 
TOTAL GUNS REPORTED LOST OR STOLEN
 City 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
LAS VEGAS, NV N/A N/A N/A N/A 1,766 1,730 2,236
KANSAS CITY, MO 908 923 957 948 1,107 1,019 968
PHOENIX, AZ 3,492 3,299 2,988 3,642 3,170 3,158 2,945
NEW ORLEANS, LA 693 681 564 599 598 549 626
ST. LOUIS, MO 628 688 643 731 607 433 419
CHARLOTTE, NC 1,529 1,106 1,011 839 854 984 892
COLORADO SPRINGS, CO 222 239 314 273 350 457 370
DENVER, CO 465 490 496 509 553 519 520
OAKLAND, CA 96 150 120 421 93 220 182
ST. PAUL, MN 81 103 96 96 92 93 94
HARTFORD, CT 22 32 23 34 35 32 31
NEW HAVEN, CT 29 31 26 25 15 33 26
CHICAGO, IL N/A N/A 530 547 432 430 536
SAN FRANCISCO, CA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 119 146
TOTAL 8,165 7,742 7,768 8,664 9,672 9,776 9,991
GUNS REPORTED LOST OR STOLEN FROM CARS
City 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
LAS VEGAS, NV N/A N/A N/A N/A 176 242 347
KANSAS CITY, MO 146 174 196 188 218 202 211
PHOENIX, AZ 475 395 450 489 399 398 459
NEW ORLEANS, LA 182 182 178 227 200 147 189
ST. LOUIS, MO 91 80 109 148 107 56 70
CHARLOTTE, NC 392 292 219 229 216 252 261
COLORADO SPRINGS, CO 53 60 101 82 89 122 92
DENVER, CO 53 72 83 121 103 114 112
OAKLAND, CA 24 18 24 17 17 38 57
ST. PAUL, MN 1 0 0 4 2 0 8
HARTFORD, CT 11 11 11 7 1 8 16
NEW HAVEN, CT 7 9 8 4 2 9 5
CHICAGO, IL N/A N/A 54 75 53 54 95
SAN FRANCISCO, CA N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 37 47
TOTAL 1,435 1,293 1,433 1,591 1,583 1,679 1,969
2014
City Population
Total guns reported  
lost or stolen  
per 100,000 residents
Guns reported  
lost or stolen from cars  
per 100,000 residents
Shares of guns  
reported lost or stolen  
taken from cars
LAS VEGAS, NV 613,599 364.4 56.6 16%
KANSAS CITY, MO 470,800 205.6 44.8 22%
PHOENIX, AZ 1,529,852 192.5 30.0 16%
NEW ORLEANS, LA 387,113 161.7 48.8 30%
ST. LOUIS, MO 317,149 132.1 22.1 17%
CHARLOTTE, NC 856,916 104.1 30.5 29%
COLORADO SPRINGS, CO 444,949 83.2 20.7 25%
DENVER, CO 665,353 78.2 16.8 22%
OAKLAND, CA 413,775 44.0 13.8 31%
ST. PAUL, MN 297,984 31.5 2.7 9%
HARTFORD, CT 124,943 24.8 12.8 52%
NEW HAVEN, CT 129,890 20.0 3.8 19%
CHICAGO, IL 2,722,389 19.7 3.5 18%
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 852,469 17.1 5.5 32%
TOTAL 9,827,181 101.7 20.0 20%
DATA SOURCES:
Data were obtained directly from 
each city’s police department 
between October 12, 2015 and 
May 25, 2016. Data from New 
Orleans reflect consolidat
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